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Abstract
In the modern world, the ubiquity of networks has made us vulnerable to various
network risks. For instance, computer viruses propagate throughout the Internet and
infect millions of computers. Misinformation spreads incredibly fast in online social
networks, such as Facebook and Twitter. Infectious diseases, such as SARS, H1N1
or Ebola, have spread geographically and killed hundreds of thousands people. In
essence, all of these situations can be modeled as a rumor spreading through a
network, where the goal is to nd the source of the rumor in order to control and
prevent these network risks. So far, extensive work has been done to develop new
approaches to eectively identify rumor sources. However, current approaches still
suer from critical weaknesses. The most dicult one is the complex spatiotempo-
ral diusion process of rumors in time-varying networks, which is the bottleneck of
current approaches. The second problem lies in the expensively computational com-
plexity of identifying multiple rumor sources. The third important issue is the huge
scale of the underlying networks, which makes it dicult to develop ecient strategies
to quickly and accurately identify rumor sources. These weaknesses prevent rumor
source identication from being applied in a broader range of real-world applications.
This thesis aims to address these issues to make rumor source identication more
eective and applicable.
The rst issue is overcome by proposing an analytical model for modeling rumor
spreading in dynamic networks. Traditional approaches assume rm connections
between individuals (i.e., static networks) so that people can trace back along the
determined connections to reach the spreading sources. In this thesis, we consider the
xx
physical mobility and online/oine status of individuals in modeling rumor spreading.
Furthermore, we propose a novel reverse dissemination strategy to narrow down the
scale of suspicious sources, which dramatically promotes the eciency of our method.
We then develop a Maximum-likelihood estimator, which can pinpoint the true source
from the suspects with a high accuracy. Experiment results justify the eectiveness
of the proposed method in real-world time-varying networks.
We address the second issue through developing an optimization framework for
multi-source identication issue. We adapt K-means from data mining and eective
distance to structure diusion pattern of multi-source rumor spreading. After this,
we formulate an optimization problem for multi-source identication, and develop a
fast method to solve the problem. Theoretical analysis proves the eciency of the
proposed method, and the experiment results demonstrate the eectiveness of the
proposed method in various real-world networks.
For the scalability issue in rumor source identication, we explore sensor tech-
niques and develop a community structure based method. Instead of assigning sen-
sors on high-centrality nodes in traditional methods, we propose placing sensors on
community bridges. Thus, we can eciently record the rumor diusion between com-
munities rather than between individuals. Then, we take the advantage of the linear
correlation between rumor spreading time and rumor infection distance to develop
a fast method which can locate the rumor source with high accuracy. Theoretical
analysis proves the eciency of the proposed method, and the experiment results
verify the signicant advantages of the proposed method in large-scale networks.
In summary, this thesis makes three major contributions: 1) propose a novel ap-
proach to identify rumor sources in time-varying networks ; 2) develop a fast approach
to identify multiple rumor sources ; 3) propose a community-based method to over-
come the scalability issue in this research area. These contributions enable rumor
source identication to be applied eectively in real-world networks, and eventually
diminish rumor damages.
Keywords: Complex networks, rumor diusion, source identication.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
With rapid urbanization and advancements in transportation technologies, the world
has become more interconnected. A contagious disease, like SARS [63], H1N1 [29] and
Ebola [103], can spread quickly through a population and lead to an epidemic [56]. It
is crucial to quickly identify the set of epidemic sources, so that potential containment
policies can be formulated to prevent further spreading of the disease [92]. In a similar
vein, computer viruses, like Cryptolocker and Alureon [62], on a few servers of a
computer network can quickly spread to other servers or computers in the network
and cause a good share of cyber-security incidents [106]. Identifying the servers in
the network that are rst infected allows us to detect the latent points of weaknesses
in the computer network, so that preventive measures can be taken to enhance the
protection at these points. The source identication problem also arises in the study of
misinformation spreading in a social network. A piece of misinformation like Barack
Obama was born in Kenya started by a few individuals can spread quickly through the
underlying social network [21,78]. In many cases, we are interested to nd the sources
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of the misinformation. For example, law enforcement agencies may be interested in
identifying the perpetrators who fabricate misinformation to manipulate the market
prices of certain stocks.
In essence, all of the above examples can be modeled as a rumor spreading in a
network of nodes. In a population network, the rumor is the disease that is transmitted
between individuals. In the example of a computer virus spreading in a network,
the rumor is the computer virus, while for the case of a misinformation spreading
in a social network, the rumor is the misinformation. In this thesis, we focus on the
problem of identifying rumor diusion sources: given a complex network and a partial
observation of rumor diusion, determine the rumor diusion source(s).
From both practical and technical aspects, it is of great signicance to identify
rumor sources. Practically, it is important to accurately identify the `culprit' of the
rumor propagation for forensic purposes. Moreover, seeking the rumor sources as
quickly as possible can nd the causation of rumors, and therefore, mitigate the
damages. Technically, the work in this eld aims at identifying the sources of rumors
based on limited knowledge of network structures and the states of a small portion of
nodes. In academia, traditional identication techniques, such as IP trace back [91]
and stepping-stone detection [93], are not sucient to seek the sources of rumors,
as they only determine the true source of packets received by a destination. In
the propagation of rumors, the source of packets is almost never the source of the
rumor propagation but just one of the many propagation participants [114]. Methods
are needed to nd propagation sources higher up in the application level and logic
structures of networks, rather than in the IP level and packets.
In the past few years, researchers have proposed a series of methods to identify
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rumor diusion sources. The initial methods were designed to work on particular
networks (e.g., regular tree and regular graphs) and with the diusion following the
traditional susceptible-infected (SI) model [22, 42, 95, 96]. Later, some other works
were proposed to deal with particular networks but with dierent epidemic models,
such as the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model and the susceptible-infected-
susceptible (SIS) model [55,59,120,121]. The constraints on particular networks were
then relaxed to generic network topologies but still assume that rumors spread along
the breadth-rst search (BFS) trees of networks [12,25,53, 84]. Recently, researchers
proposed methods to identify propagation sources by using sensor techniques [1, 82,
94], but they are still restricted in the BFS trees of networks. In the real world,
rumor diusion is a complex process and it does not always follow the ideal BFS-tree
spreading scheme. It can be aected by the impacts from the dynamic of individuals,
the impacts from the structure of the underlying network, the impacts from other
related rumors, etc. Therefore, previous methods of rumor sources identication are
far from applying eectively and eciently in real-world networks.
In many ways, current approaches of rumor source identication are facing the
following three critical challenges.
 The underlying networks are often of time-varying topology. For example, in
human contact networks, the neighborhood of individuals moving over a geo-
graphic space evolves over time, and the interaction between the individuals
appears/disappears in online social network websites (such as Facebook and
Twitter) [87]. Indeed, the spreading of rumors is aected by duration, sequence,
and concurrency of contacts among nodes [13, 104]. Then, can we model the
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way that rumor spreads in time-varying networks? Can we estimate the prob-
ability of an arbitrary node being infected by a rumor? How do we detect
rumor source in time-varying networks? Can we estimate the infection scale
and infection time of the rumor?
 Rumors often emerge from multiple sources. However, current methods mainly
focus on the identication of a single rumor source in networks. A few approach-
es are proposed for identifying multiple rumor sources but they all suer from
extremely high computational complexity, which is not practical to be adopted
in real-world networks. In this thesis, we will answer the following question-
s corresponding to multi-source identication. How many sources are there?
Where did the diusion emerge? When did the diusion start?
 Another critical challenge in this research area is the scalability issue. Curren-
t methods generally require scanning the whole underlying network of rumor
spreading to locate rumor sources. However, real-world networks of rumor d-
iusion are often of a huge scale and extremely complex structure. Thus, it is
impractical to scan the whole network to locate the rumor sources. We develop
ecient approaches to identify rumor sources by taking the structural features
of networks and the diusion patterns of rumors into account, and therefore
address the scalability issue.
To address the above challenges, this thesis aims to achieve a breakthrough in rumor
source identication to enable its eective applicability in real world applications.
The approaches involve the complex network theory, information diusion theory,
probability theory, and applied statistics.
4
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of time-varying mobile-phone call (MPC) network [44]. Panels
(a), and (b) show calls within 3 hours between people in the same town in two dierent
time windows. Panel (c) presents the total weighted social network structure, which was
recorded by aggregating interactions during 6 months. Node size and colors describe the
activity of users, while link width and color represent weight.
1.2 Research Questions
As presented in the previous section, current studies on rumor source identication
encounter three critical challenges: time-varying networks, multiple rumor sources
and scalability issue. In this section, we will introduce the research questions examined
in each chapter in detail.
1.2.1 Rumor Diusion in Time-varying Networks
In the real world, it takes dierent periods of time for nodes to transmit information
to their neighbors. The temporal dynamic is an important factor, particularly when
the propagation concerns human involvements [110]. Let us take the mobile phone
call (MPC) network [44] as a example. Fig. 1.1(A) and 1.1(B) show two snapshots
of the MPC network at dierent times covering a few hours of calls in a town. The
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two plots capture dynamical interaction patterns not visible from the aggregated net-
work representation (Fig. 1.1(C)). Traditional methods of rumor source identication
assume the rm connection between individuals (i.e., the network in Fig. 1.1(C)).
However, this will dramatically overt the actual time-varying network structure.
This is also the reason that traditional methods present a low accuracy in identifying
rumor sources in real-world networks.
Technically, the temporal dynamic of networks is complex. It involves the impact
of the time zone and the population distribution [18]. Individual habits also strongly
aect the temporal dynamic of rumor diusion. Currently, litter literature considers
temporal dynamics of the underlying network where rumors diuse. We consider these
factors in modeling rumor propagation. In other words, we model rumor propagation
by considering the realistic temporal dynamics of individuals and their interactions.
Based on the innovative model, we can trace back the rumor diusion source and
also predict its future trend. This will make a fundamental contribution to rumor
source identication, and open up a new direction of modeling rumor propagation.
Therefore, identifying rumor sources in time-varying networks is the rst research
question to address in this thesis.
1.2.2 Rumor Diusion with Multiple Sources
In the real world, the propagation of rumors often initiates from multiple sources.
For example, a contagious disease emerging from a small population can spread geo-
graphically and infect hundreds of thousands of people [56]. Culprits employ a botnet
to spread computer viruses and nally infect millions of computers and servers [8,28].
Fig. 1.2 shows an example to illustrate the rumor diusion starting from two sources.
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of the diusion with two rumor sources. The blue group of nodes
hear the rumor from one source, and the red group hear the rumor from the other source.
The yellow nodes are those who receive rumors from both sources.
One source mainly infects the blue nodes, the other source mainly contaminates the
red nodes, the yellow nodes are infected by both sources. Few of current methods are
developed for multi-source identication. Some single-source identication methods
can be adapted to identify multiple rumor sources. However, they all suer from the
expensive computational complexity (generally O(Nk), where N is number of infected
nodes and k is the number of sources). Therefore, they are not practical to be applied
in real-world networks.
Technically, the methods of single source identication cannot be directly used for
multiple source cases. This is because the spread initiated from multiple sources can-
not be thought of as the superposition of multiple single-source propagation processes.
Meanwhile, current multi-source identication methods are too computationally ex-
pensive to obtain results. Moreover, current methods ignore an important factor: the
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pattern of multi-source rumor diusion. This is the crucial factor that we consid-
er in developing new methods for multi-source identication. Using the pattern of
multi-source rumor diusion, we substantially simplify the multi-source identication
problem and develop a fast method to solve this problem. Therefore, the identi-
cation of multiple rumor sources is the second research question to address in this
thesis.
1.2.3 Rumor Diusion in Large-scale Networks
In the real world, rumor diusion often occurs in large-scale networks, such as human
contact networks, online social networks, computer networks or the World Wide Web.
Let us take a real event on Twitter for an example. On April 15th of 2013, two
explosions at the Boston Marathon nish line shocked the entire United States [101].
There were millions of tweets about it, and many of the tweets contained rumors and
misinformation. Within a couple of days, multiple pieces of misinformation went viral
on various social media. The huge scale of the Twitter network severely challenges
traditional rumor source detection methods. Therefore quickly identifying rumor
sources in large-scale networks is of great signicance in practice.
Technically, current methods are too computationally expensive to quickly and
accurately detect rumor sources in large-scale networks. This is because most of cur-
rent methods require scanning the entire network to locate the rumor sources. More-
over, current methods ignore an important fact that rumor diusion often presents
a network-driven phenomenon. We show an example in Fig. 1.3 to illustrate one of
the important structures of complex networks   community structure. The left plot
presents the diverse communities in the network. The right plot shows the network
8
Figure 1.3: Left: The community construct of a network. Right: The observed network.
in our observation. Appropriately utilizing the structure of networks can facilitate
our rumor source detection work in large-scale networks. This is the crucial factor
we will consider in developing new methods for identifying rumor sources in large-
scale networks. Accordingly, based on the structure of the underlying network, we
dramatically decrease the scanning of the entire network to scanning a small commu-
nity of the network. Therefore, we propose developing ecient and scalable source
identication methods as the nal research question in this thesis.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This section aims to establish the structural organization of the thesis. According to
three research issues addressed in this thesis: time-varying networks, multiple rumor
sources and scalability issue, the chapters are organized as follows.
 Chapter 2 introduces the preliminary knowledge adopted in this thesis, including
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some basic concepts and network generating models in graph theory, informa-
tion propagation models and the Maximum-Likelihood Estimation method.
 Chapter 3 presents a comprehensive survey on the development of rumor source
identication, including relevant concepts, assumptions, and emerging tech-
niques in this area. Eorts have been given to identify various research di-
rections and emerging research issues.
 Chapter 4 focuses on the time-varying networks issue in the context of network-
driven rumor propagation. This chapter specically investigates how to model
rumor diusion in a dynamic network by reducing the network into a series
of static network windows. This chapter also proposes an eective two-stage
method to detect rumor sources in time-varying networks. The rst stage nar-
rows down the suspicious rumor sources. The second stage pinpoints the true
source from the suspects. The method involves developing a reverse dissemina-
tion method to trace back rumor in time-varying networks, and a maximum-
likelihood method is explored to compute the probability of the status of arbi-
trary individuals.
 Chapter 5 proposes a novel K-center method to address the multiple rumor
sources issue. This chapter focuses on how to eciently and eectively detec-
t multiple rumor sources by exploring multi-source rumor diusion patterns.
Through combining the diusion patterns and network partition techniques,
this chapter formulates the multi-source identication problem as an optimiza-
tion problem and proposes a fast method to solve the problem. This chapter
also addresses three important problems in this area: (i) estimating the number
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of rumors sources, (ii)locating the topological places where the rumor emerges,
and (iii) estimating the time when the rumor breaks out.
 Chapter 6 aims at addressing the scalability issue in identifying rumor sources
in large-scale networks. This chapter specically explores how to utilize the
structural patterns of networks for rumor propagation. With the considera-
tion of community structure and sensor techniques in complex networks, this
chapter proposed a community-structure based method. Compared with the
traditional methods, the proposed community-structure based method dramat-
ically decreases the searching scale of rumor sources from the entire network to
a small community.
 Chapter 7 summarizes the contributions of this thesis, and presents some pos-
sible suggestions and extensions for further research.
To maintain the readability, each chapter is organized in a self-contained format,
and some essential contents, e.g. denition, are briey recounted in related chapters.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
This chapter provides some preliminary work about rumor source identication. We
rst introduce some concepts related to complex networks, including node central-
ities, network generating models, and community detection methods. Secondly, we
introduce three classic information diusion models adopted in this thesis. Finally,
we explain the maximum-likelihood estimation method adopted in this thesis.
2.1 Complex Networks
2.1.1 Node Centralities
Degree Given a node i, the degree of node i is the number of edges connected to
node i. In general, the larger degree of a node, the more inuential of the node
(see the black nodes in Fig. 2.1(A)).
Betweenness The betweenness of a node stands for the number of shortest paths
from all nodes to all others that pass through the node [31]. Researchers have
found some nodes which do not have large degrees also play a vital role in the
information diusion [38, 52]. As shown in Fig. 2.1(B), the degree of node E
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of dierent centrality measures. (A) Degree; (B) Betweenness; (C)
Closeness; (D) Jordan centrality; (E) Eigenvector centrality.
is smaller than nodes A, B, C and D. However, node E is noticeably more
important to information spread as it is the connector of two large groups. To
locate this kind of nodes, researchers introduced the measure of betweenness.
Closeness The closeness of a node is dened as the average length of the shortest
path between the node and all other reachable nodes [31, 74]. As shown in
Fig. 2.1(C), this measure discloses the nodes that can rapidly disseminate
information to all the other nodes. This measure concentrates more on the
information propagation speed rather than the connectivity of a network [74].
Jordan centrality The Jordan centrality of a node measures the maximum geodesic
distance (shortest-path distance) from the node to a given set of infected nodes
in the network [20, 35]. The Jordan centers stand for the nodes that have
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minimum Jordan centrality. Suppose all the nodes are infected in the graph
in Fig. 2.1(D), then nodes A, B, C are the Jordan centers of the graph with
Jordan centrality 3. Equivalently, Jordan center is equal to the radius of a
network [102].
Eigenvector centrality It is dened as the eigenvector of the adjacency matrix
associated to the largest eigenvalue [11, 71]. Equivalently, the eigenvector cen-
trality of a node is proportional to the sum of the eigenvector centrality of all
its neighboring nodes. In the real world, an important node is characterized
by its connectivity to other important nodes. Thus, a node with a high eigen-
vector centrality is a well-connected node and has a dominant inuence on the
surrounding network. As shown in Fig. 2.1(E), node V1 and V3 have the high-
est eigenvector centrality in the graph. Readers could refer to [11] for further
computation methods.
2.1.2 Network Generating Models
Various models devoted to reproducing the growth and evolution of network topology
have been developed to capture dierent characteristics of complex networks. In the
following subsections, we will introduce three classic network generating models.
Random Networks
The rst network generating model proposed in 1959 by Erdos and Renyi [1960]
described the process of growing a random network : n nodes connected by m edges
randomly selected from all n(n   1)=2 possible edges with equal probability p. The
degree of nodes in the Erdos-Renyi (ER) network presents a Poisson distribution. The
14
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Figure 2.2: The plot of the mean component size excluding the giant component if there is
one (black solid line), and the giant component size (red dashed line), for the ER random
network [69]. The mean degree z = p(n  1).
other key feature is a sudden change of the network connectivity with the increase of
p: when p is small, many clusters are small and isolated, but once p increases to be
larger than a critical value, the network suddenly becomes very dense where almost
all the nodes are linked to each other in a giant connected component (see Fig. 2.2).
Small-World Networks
The small-world network originated from the experiment of Milgram [65], in which
selected persons were asked to deliver a letter to a target receiver by only passing the
letter to their acquaintances. Among all the successful instances, the average length
of these communication chains was short, around six steps. The phenomenon is well
known as \small-world eect" or \six degrees of separation". A small-world network
has acquaintanceship-based edges and the distance between a random pair of people
is smaller than expected. In the real world setting, the small-world eect implies
that most of the friends of an individual are people living around, but he may also
15
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Figure 2.3: The Watts-Strogatz model reproduces the small-world phenomenon by rewiring
edges in a regular network according to the randomness parameter p [108].
have a few friends far away. People are moving around, but the geographic distance
limits the strength of social relationships. The Watts-Strogatz model was designed
to reproduce the small-world phenomenon by rewiring each link in a regular network
with a probability p [108]. As shown in Fig. 2.3, when p = 0, the network is fully
ordered; when p = 1, every edge is rewired so as to create a random network; when
0 < p < 1, we obtain a small-world network with small average shortest path and
high clustering coecient [108].
Scale-Free Networks
A scale-free network has a power-law degree distribution, commonly seen in many
real-world networks, such as the Internet, the lm actor network, the scientic col-
laboration network, the citation network, and many others (see Fig. 2.4) [4, 9, 69].
Highly unbalanced degree distribution in a social network indicates that, in a large
group of people, only a few are extremely popular and most others do not have too
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Figure 2.4: The connectivities of various large real-world networks have scale-free distri-
butions, (a) actor collaboration graph, (b) the World Wide Web, and (c) the power grid
network [9].
many contacts. It has been suggested to be the most critical feature of social net-
works [73].
Among many models that can capture the heterogeneous distribution in connec-
tivity [23, 27, 47{49, 73], Barabasi-Albert model was the rst to generate a scale-free
network with two simple mechanisms: continuously adding new nodes into the system
(\growth") and connecting with other nodes with preference to the high-degree ones
(\preferential attachment") [9]. Motivated by the structure of the Web graph, the
copying model added a new node into the network and linked it to a random existing
node or its neighbors [47,49]. Another model proposed by Newman et al. [73] aimed
to build up a random graph with the arbitrary degree setting. The ranking model
grew the network according to a rank of the nodes by any given prestige measure;
the probability of linking a target node could be any power law function of its rank,
resulting in a power-law degree distribution [27].
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2.1.3 Community Detection
A community is a group of densely connected nodes in a graph. The community
structure is claimed to be one key property of various complex networks, suggesting
that a network can be partitioned into several (potentially overlapped) clusters so
that nodes in one cluster are densely connected internally but not externally; such
clustering might derive from common interests of people, geographical divisions of
power grids, or functional similarity of proteins [32, 72]. How to detect communities
has been widely studied [26], popular methods including modularity optimization [70],
Louvain method [10], infomap [89], clique percolation [76], and link clustering [2].
The two methods, Infomap and link clustering, applied in the thesis are introduced
as follows.
Infomap The infomap community detection method is built on the assumption that
a random walker is more likely to be trapped in communities than to trav-
el between communities. The path of a random walker can be encoded, and
then compressed given a hierarchical network partition so that the encoded
description is minimum. The duality between nding community structure in
a network and the coding problem is: to nd an ecient code, it looks for a
module partition M of n nodes into m modules so as to minimize the expected
description length of a random walk. By using the module partition M , the
average description length of a single step is given by
L(M) = qyH(L) +
mX
i=1
piH(P i); (2.1.1)
where H(L) is the entropy of module names in M ; H(P i) is the entropy of
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intra-module movements; qy gives the probability that the random walk switch-
es modules on a given step; pi is the sum of the probability of intra-module
movements inside the module i and the probability of exiting i. The rst part
of the formula describes the entropy of the movement between communities,
and the second part sums up the entropy within each community. Eventually
infomap applies computational search algorithm to nd the best partition as
the outcome [89].
Link clustering Dierent from the Infomap method, the link clustering algorithm
aims at discovering overlapped communities in which a node is allowed to be-
long to multiple groups. The link clustering algorithm reinvents communities
as groups of links rather than nodes. The set of neighbors of a node i is denoted
as Ni. Given a pair of links with one shared node, eij and ejk, the similarity be-
tween these two links is the Jaccard similarity between neighbor sets of distinct
nodes:
S(eij; ejk) =
jNi \Nkj
jNi [Nkj : (2.1.2)
Then a dendrogram is built up according to these similarities using single-linkage
hierarchical clustering and cutting the dendrogram at some level produces the
overlapped community structure. Given a partition P = fP1; P2; :::; PCg, a
partition density D can be computed by the average partition density weighted
by the fraction of present links in each partition:
D =
X
c
mc
M
Dc =
2
M
X
c
mc
mc   (nc   1)
(nc   2)(nc   1) ; (2.1.3)
where mc and nc are the numbers of edges and nodes in the partition Pc, respec-
tively. The cutting threshold in the dendrogram can be determined by achieving
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Figure 2.5: Illustration of three classic epidemic spreading models. (A) SI model; (B) SIR
model; (C) SIS model.
a maximum partition density.
2.2 Information Diusion Models
Early models concerning communication dynamics were inspired by studies of epi-
demic spreading [6, 7, 19, 33, 85]. Similar to how an infectious disease is transmitted
among the population, a piece of information can pass from one individual to an-
other through social connections and \infected" individuals can, in turn, propagate
the information to others, possibly generating a full-scale contagion. The susceptible-
infected (SI) [45,46], susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) [6], and susceptible-infected-
susceptible (SIS) [7] models are three classical models in epidemiology, in which the
infected population grows exponentially until the rate of infection is balanced by the
rate of recovery, or the contagion nally dies o when the recovery rate prevails. As
another foundation for this eld, dierent models refer to dierent scenarios in seek-
ing propagation origins. Currently, researchers mainly employ these three epidemic
models in rumor source identication:
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2.2.1 Susceptible-Infected model
In this model, nodes are initially susceptible and can be infected along with the
propagation of rumor (Fig. 2.5(A)). Once a node is infected, it remains infected
forever. This model focuses on the infection process S ! I, regardless of the recovery
process.
2.2.2 Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model
Recovery processes are considered in this model (Fig. 2.5(B)). Similarly, nodes are
initially susceptible and can be infected along with the propagation. Infected nodes
can then be recovered, and never become susceptible again. This model deals with
the infection and curing process S ! I ! R.
2.2.3 Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible model
In this model, infected nodes can become susceptible again after they are cured (Fig.
2.5(C)). This model stands for the infection and recovery process S ! I ! S.
There are also other epidemic models, such as SIRS [99], SEIR [116], MSIR [37],
SEIRS [17]. Readers could refer to the work of [113] and [106] for more epidemic
models. Future work may consider these models in rumor source identication.
2.3 Maximum-Likelihood Estimation
Maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) [Cowan, 1998] is a method of estimating the
parameters  of a statistical model M , given the independent observed data X =
fx1; x2; :::; xng. Let us assume the probability of observing xi in the model M given
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parameters  is f(xij). Then the likelihood of having parameters  equals to the
probability of observing X given :
L(jX) = f(Xj) = f(x1j)f(x2j):::f(xnj) = i = 1nf(xij): (2.3.1)
logL(jX) =
nX
i=1
logf(xij): (2.3.2)
^ = arg max log L(jX) = arg max
nX
i=1
log f(xij): (2.3.3)
To nd the optimal parameter ^ which best describes the observed data given the
model and thus provides the largest log-likelihood value, we can solve the Eq. (2.3.3)
or computationally search for the best solution in the parameter space. This thesis
mainly adopts MLE to estimate the probability of a node being a candidate rumor
source.
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Chapter 3
Rumor Source Identication
This chapter provides an extensive literature review on rumor source identication
by tracing research trends and hierarchically reviewing the contributions along each
research line regarding rumor source identication.
This chapter consists of four parts. First, we introduce dierent types of obser-
vations on rumor diusion. Second, for each type of observations, we review the
existing approaches and analyze their pros and cons. Third, comparative studies are
provided according to various experiment settings and diusion scenarios. Finally,
we summarize the analysis and comparative studies, and conclude the perspective
research issues in this area.
3.1 Categories of Observations
One of the major premises in rumor source identication is the observation of node
states during the propagation process. Diverse observations lead to a great variety of
methods. According to the literature, there are three main categories of observations:
complete observations, snapshots, and sensor observations. An illustration of these
three categories of observations is shown in Fig. 3.1. It is clear that the snapshot and
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of three categories of observation in networks. (A) Complete
observation; (B) Snapshot; (C) Sensor observation.
sensor observation provide much less information for identifying propagation sources
compared with the complete observation.
3.1.1 Complete Observation
Given a time t during the propagation, complete observation presents the exact state
for each node in the network at time t. The state of a node stands for the node having
been infected, recovered, or remaining susceptible. This type of observation provides
comprehensive knowledge of a transient status of the network. Through this type
of observation, source identication techniques are advised with sucient knowledge.
An example of the complete observation is shown in Fig. 3.1(A).
3.1.2 Snapshot Observation
A snapshot provides partial knowledge of network status at a given time t. Partial
knowledge is presented in four forms: (i) nodes reveal their infection status with
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probability ; (ii) we recognize all infected nodes, but cannot distinguish susceptible
or recovered nodes; (iii) only a set of nodes were observed at time t when the snapshot
was taken; (iv) only the nodes who were infected exactly at time t were observed. An
example of the 4-th type of snapshots is shown in Fig. 3.1(B).
3.1.3 Sensor Observation
Sensors are rstly injected into networks, and then the propagation dynamics over
these sensor nodes are collected, including their states, state transition time and
infection directions. In fact, sensors also stand for users or computers in networks.
The dierence between sensors and other nodes in networks is that they are usually
monitored by network administrators in practice. Therefore, the sensors can record
all details of the rumor propagation over them, and their life can be theoretically
assumed to be everlasting during the propagation dynamics. This is dierent from
the mobile sensor devices which may be out of work when their batteries run out. As
an example, we show the sensor observation in Fig. 3.1(C).
In the following three sections, we analyze dierent techniques for source identi-
cation and discuss their pros and cons. We classify the source identication methods
into three categories in accordance with the three dierent types of observations in
Section 3.1. The taxonomy of current methods is shown in Fig. 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Taxonomy of current source identication methods.
3.2 Rumor Source Identication Based on Com-
plete Observations
In this section, we summarize the methods of source identication developed under
complete observations. There are two main techniques in this category: rumor center
and eigenvector center based methods (see Fig. 3.2).
3.2.1 Single Rumor Center
Shah and Zaman [95], [96] introduced rumor centrality for source identication. They
assume that information spreads in tree-like networks and the information propaga-
tion follows the SI model. They also assume each node receives information from
only one of its neighbors. Since we consider the complete observations of networks,
the source node must be one of the infected nodes. This method is proposed for the
propagation of rumors originating from a single source.
Method Assuming an infected node as the source, its rumor centrality is dened
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as the number of distinct propagation paths originating from the source. The node
with the maximum rumor centrality is called the rumor center. For regular trees, the
rumor center is considered as the propagation origin. For generic networks, researchers
employ BFS trees to represent the original networks. Each BFS tree corresponds to
a probability  of a rumor that chooses this tree as the propagation path. In this
case, the source node is revised as the one that holds the maximum product of rumor
centrality and .
Analysis In essence, the method is to seek a node from which the propagation
matches the complete observation the best. As proven in [95, 96], the rumor center
is equivalent to the closeness center for a tree-like network. However, for a generic
network, the closeness center may not equal the rumor center. The eectiveness of the
method is further examined by the work in [97]. The authors proved that the rumor
center method can still provide guaranteed accuracy when relaxing two assumption-
s: the exponential spreading time and the regular trees. This method was further
explored in the snapshot scenario that nodes reveal whether they have been infected
with probability  [42]. When  was large enough, the authors proved the accuracy
of the rumor center method can still be guaranteed. Z. Wang et al. [107] extended
the discussion of the single rumor center into a more complex scenario with multiple
snapshots. Although snapshot only provided partial knowledge of rumor spreading,
the authors proved that multiple independent snapshots could dramatically improve
temporally sequential snapshots. The analysis in [107] suggested that the complete
observation of rumor propagation could be approximated by multiple independent
snapshots.
Discussion There are several strong assumptions far from reality. First, it is
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considered on a very special class of networks: innite trees. Generic networks have
to be reconstructed into BFS trees before seeking propagation origins. Second, rumors
are implicitly assumed to spread in a unicast way (i.e., an infectious node can only
infect one of its neighbors at one time step). Third, the infection probability between
neighboring nodes is equal to 1. In the real world, however, networks are far more
complex than trees, with rumors often spreading in multicast or broadcast ways, and
the infection probability between neighboring nodes diering from each other.
3.2.2 Local Rumor Center
Following the assumptions of the single rumor center method, Dong et al. [22] pro-
posed a local rumor center method to identify rumor sources. This method designates
a set of nodes as suspicious sources. Therefore, it reduces the scale of seeking origins.
Method Dong et al. [22] extended the approaches and results in [95] and [96]
to identify the source of propagation in networks. Following the denition of the
rumor center, they dened the local rumor center as the node with the highest rumor
centrality compared to other suspicious infected nodes. The local rumor center is
considered as the rumor source.
Analysis For regular trees with every node having degree d, the authors analyze
the accuracy  of the local rumor center method. To construct a regular tree, the
degree d of each node should be at least 2. For regular trees, Dong et al. [22] derived
the following conclusions. (i) When d = 2, the accuracy of the local rumor center
method follows O(1=
p
n), where n is the number of infected nodes. Therefore, when n
is suciently large, the accuracy is close to 0. (ii) When the suspicious set degenerates
into the entire network, the accuracy  grows from 0.25 to 0.307 as d increases from 3
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to +1. This means that the minimum accuracy  is 25% and the maximum accuracy
is 30.7%. (iii) When the suspicious nodes form a connected subgraph of the network,
the accuracy  signicantly exceeds 1=k when d = 3, where k is the the number of
suspicious nodes. (iv) When there are only two suspect nodes, the accuracy  is at
least 0:75 if d = 3, and  increases with the distance between the two suspects. (v)
When multiple suspicious nodes form a connected subgraph, the accuracy  is lower
than when these nodes form several disconnected subgraphs.
Discussion The local rumor center is actually the node with the highest rumor
centrality in the priori set of suspects. The advantage of the local rumor center
method is that it dramatically reduces the source-searching scale. However, it has
the same drawbacks as the single rumor center method.
3.2.3 Multiple Rumor Centers
Luo et al. [58] extended the single rumor center method to identify multiple sources.
In addition to the basic assumptions, they further assumed the number of sources
was known for the method of identifying multiple rumor centers.
Method Based on the denition of rumor centrality for a single node, Luo et
al. [58] extended rumor centrality to a set of nodes, which is dened as the number
of distinct propagation paths originating from the set. They proposed a two-source
estimator to compute the rumor centrality when there were only two sources. For
multiple sources, they proposed a two-step method. In the rst step, they assumed
a set of infected nodes as sources. All infected nodes were divided into dierent
partitions by using the Voronoi partition algorithm [36] on these sources. The single
rumor center method was then employed to identify the source in each partition.
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In the second step, estimated sources were calibrated by the two-source estimator
between any two neighboring partitions. These two steps were iterated until the
estimated sources become steady.
Analysis Luo et al. [58] are the rst to employ the rumor center method to
identify multiple rumor sources. They further investigate the performance of the
two-source estimator on geometric trees [96]. The accuracy approximates to 1 when
the infection graph becomes large. This method has also been extended to identify
multiple sources with snapshot observations. Because snapshots only provide partial
knowledge about the spreading dynamics of rumors in networks, W. Zang et al. [118]
introduce a score-based method to assess the states of other nodes in networks, which
indirectly form a complete observation on networks.
Discussion According to the denition of rumor centrality of a set of nodes, we
need to calculate the number of distinct propagation paths originating from the node
set. It is too computationally expensive to obtain the result. Even though Luo et al.
have proposed a two-step method to reduce the complexity, the two-step method still
needs O(Nk) computations, where k is the number of rumor sources. This method
can hardly be used in the real world, especially for large-scale networks.
3.2.4 Minimum Description Length
Prakash et al. [83, 84] proposed a minimum description length (MDL) method for
source identication. This method is considered for generic networks. They assumed
rumor propagation following the SI model.
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Method Given an arbitrary infected node as the source node, minimum descrip-
tion length corresponds to the probability of obtaining the infection graph. For gener-
ic networks, it is too computationally expensive to obtain the probability. Instead,
Prakash et al. [84] introduced an upper bound of the probability and detected the
origin by maximizing the upper bound. They claimed that to maximize the upper
bound is to nd the smallest eigenvalue min and the corresponding eigenvector umin
of the Laplacian matrix of the infection graph. The Laplacian matrix is widely used
in spectral graph theory and has many applications in various elds. This matrix is
mathematically dened as L = D A, where D is the diagonal degree matrix and A
is the adjacency matrix. According to Prakash et al.'s work in [83,84], the node with
the largest score in the eigenvector umin refers to the propagation source.
Analysis This method can also be used to seek multiple sources. The authors
adopted the minimum description length (MDL) cost function [34]. This was used to
evaluate the `goodness' of a node being in the source set. To search the next source
node, they rst removed the previous source nodes from the infected set. Then, they
replayed the process of searching the single source in the remaining infection graph.
These two steps were iterated until the MDL cost function stopped decreasing.
Discussion Due to the high complexity in computing matrix eigenvalues, gen-
erally O(N3), the DML method is not suitable for identifying sources in large-scale
networks. Moreover, the number of true sources is generally unknown. Further to
this, the gap between the upper bound and the real value of the probability has not
been studied, and therefore, the accuracy of this method is not guaranteed.
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3.2.5 Dynamic Age
Fioriti et al. [25] introduced the dynamic age method for source identication in
generic networks. The assumption for this method is the same as the MDL method.
Method Fioriti et al. took the advantage of the correlation between the eigenvalue
and the `age' of a node in a network. The `oldest' nodes which were associated to
those with largest eigenvalues were considered as the sources of a propagation [119].
Meanwhile, they utilized the dynamical importance of node in [86]. It essentially
calculated the reduction of the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix after a
node had been removed. A large reduction after the removal of a node implied the
node was relevant to the `aging' of a propagation. By combing these two techniques,
Fioriti et al. proposed the concept of dynamical age for an arbitrary node i as follows,
DAi = jm   imj=m; (3.2.1)
where m was the maximum eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, and 
i
m was the
maximum eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix after node i was removed. The nodes
with the highest dynamic age were considered as the sources.
Analysis This method is essentially dierent from the previous MDL method.
The MDL method is to nd the smallest eigenvalues and the corresponding eigen-
vectors of Lapacian matrices, while the dynamic age method is to nd the largest
eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix.
Discussion Similar to the MDL method, the dynamic age method is not suitable
for identifying sources in large-scale networks due to the complexity of calculating
eigenvectors. Moreover, since there is no threshold to determine the oldest nodes, the
number of source nodes is uncertain.
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3.3 Rumor Source Identication based on Snap-
shots
In the real world, a complete observation of an entire network is hardly possible,
especially for large-scale networks. Snapshots are observations closer to reality. It only
provides partial knowledge of a propagation in networks. There are three techniques
of source identication developed on snapshot: Jordan center, message passing and
concentricity based methods (see the taxonomy in Fig. 3.2).
3.3.1 Jordan Center
Zhu and Ying [120] proposed the Jordan center method for rumor source identi-
cation. They assumed rumor propagated in tree-like networks and the propagation
followed SIR model. All infected nodes were given, but the susceptible nodes and and
recovered nodes were undistinguishable. This method was proposed for single source
propagation.
Method Zhu and Ying [120] proposed a sample path based approach to identify
the propagation source. An optimal sample path was the one which most likely leaded
to the observed snapshot of a network. The source associated with the optimal sample
path was proven to be the Jordan center of the infection graph. Jordan center was
then considered as the rumor source.
Analysis Zhu and Ying [121] further extended the sample path based approach to
the heterogeneous SIR model. Heterogeneous SIR model means the infection proba-
bilities between any two neighboring nodes are dierent, and the recovery probabilities
of infected nodes dier from each other. They proved that on innite trees, the source
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node associated with the optimal sample path was also the Jordan center. Moreover,
Luo et al. [57, 59] investigated the sample path based approach in the SI and SIS
models. They obtained the same conclusion as in the SIR model.
Discussion Similar to rumor center based methods, the Jordan center method is
considered on innite tree-like networks which are far away from real-world networks.
3.3.2 Dynamic Message Passing
Lokhov et al. [53] proposed the dynamic message-passing (DMP) method by assuming
that propagation follows the SIR model in generic networks. Only propagation time
t and the states of a set of nodes at time t are known.
Method The DMP method is based on the dynamic equations approach pro-
posed in [43]. Assuming an arbitrary node as the source node, it rst estimates the
probabilities of other nodes to be in dierent states at time t. Then, it multiplies the
probabilities of the observed set of nodes being in the observed states. The source
node which can obtain the maximum product is considered the propagation origin.
Analysis The DMP method takes into account the spreading dynamics of the
propagation process. This is very dierent from the previous centrality based methods
(e.g., rumor center and Jordan center based methods). Lokhov et al. [53] claimed
that the DMP source identication method dramatically outperformed the previous
centrality based methods.
Discussion An important prerequisite of the DMP method is that we must
know the propagation time t. However, the propagation time t is generally unknown.
Besides, the computational complexity of this method is O(tN2d), where N is the
number of nodes in a network and d is the average degree of the network. If the
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of wavefronts in the shortest path tree v. Readers can refer to the
work \The Hidden Geometry of Complex, Network-driven Contagion Phenomena" [12] for
the details of the wavefronts.
underlying network is strongly connected, it will be computationally expensive to use
the DMP method to identify the propagation source.
3.3.3 Eective Distance Based Method
Assuming propagation follows SI model in weighted networks, Brockmann and Hel-
bing [12] proposed an eective distance based method for rumor source identication.
This method is considered in another case of snapshot wavefront.
Method Brockmann and Helbing [12] rst proposed a new concept, eective
distance, to represent the propagation process. The eective distance from node n to
a neighboring node m, dmn, is dened as
dmn = 1  logPmn; (3.3.1)
where Pmn is the fraction of a propagation with destination m emanating from n.
From the perspective of a chosen source node v, the set of shortest paths in terms of
eective distance to all other nodes constitutes a shortest-path tree 	v. Brockmann
and Helbing [12] empirically obtain that the propagation process initiated from node
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v on the original network can be represented as wavefronts on the shortest-path tree
	v. To illustrate this process, a simple example is shown in Fig. 3.3 (refers to [12]).
According to the propagation process of wavefronts, the spreading concentricity can
only be observed from the perspective of the propagation source. Then, the node,
which has the minimum standard deviation and mean of eective distances to the
nodes in the observed wavefront, is considered as the source node.
Analysis The information propagation process in networks is complex and network-
driven. The combined multiscale nature and intrinsic heterogeneity of real-world
networks make it dicult to develop an intuitive understanding of these processes.
Brockmann and Helbing [12] reduce the complex spatiotemporal patterns to a simple
wavefront propagation process by using eective distance.
Discussion To use the eective distance based method for source identication,
we need to compute the shortest distances from any suspicious source to the observed
infected nodes. This leads to high computational complexity, especially for large-scale
networks.
3.4 Rumor Source Identication based on Sensor
Observations
In the real world, a further strategy to identify propagation sources is based on
sensors in networks. The sensors report the direction in which information transmits
through them, and the time at which the information arrives at them. There are two
techniques developed in this category: statistics and greedy rules (see the taxonomy
in Fig. 3.2).
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3.4.1 Gaussian Estimator
Assuming propagation follows SI model in tree-like networks, Pinto et al. [82] proposed
a Gaussian method for single source identication. They also assume there is a
deterministic propagation time on each edge, which are independent and identically
distributed with Gaussian distribution.
Method This method is divided into two steps. In the rst step, they reduce
the scale of seeking origins. According to the direction in which information arrived
at the sensors, it uniquely determines a subtree Ta. The subtree Ta is guaranteed
to contain the propagation origin [82]. In the second step, they use the following
Gaussian technique to seek the source in Ta. On the one hand, given a sensor node
o1, they calculate the `observed delay' between o1 and the other sensors. On the
other hand, assuming an arbitrary node s 2 Ta as the source, they calculate the
`deterministic delay' for every sensor node relative to o1 by using the deterministic
propagation time of the edges. The node, which can minimize the distance between
the `observed delays' and the `deterministic delays' of sensor nodes, is considered as
the propagation source.
Analysis This method is considered on tree-like networks. For generic networks,
Pinto et al. [82] assume that information spreads along the BFS tree, and search
rumor source in the BFS trees. It is improved by combining community recognition
techniques [82] in order to reduce the number of deployed sensors in networks. By
choosing the nodes between communities and with high betweenness values as sensors,
A. Louni et al. [54] reduce 3% fewer sensors than the original method [82].
Discussion For generic networks, the Gaussian estimator is of complexityO(N3).
Again, it is too computationally expensive to use this method for large-scale networks.
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3.4.2 Monte Carlo Method
Agaskar and Lu [1] proposed a fast Monte Carlo method for source identication in
generic networks. They assume propagation follows the heterogeneous SI model in
which the infection probabilities between any two neighboring nodes are dierent. In
addition, the observation of sensors is obtained in a xed time window.
Method This method consists of two steps. In the rst step, assuming an arbi-
trary node as the source, they introduce an alternate representation for the infection
process initiated from the source. The alternate representation is derived in terms of
the infection time of each edge. Based on the alternate representation, they sample
the infection time for each sensor. In the second step, they compute the gap between
the observed infection time and the sampled infection time of sensors. They further
use the Monte Carlo approach to approximate the gap. The node which can minimize
the gap is considered as the propagation origin.
Analysis The computational complexity of this method isO(LN log(N)="), where
L is the number of sensor nodes, and " is the assumed error. The complexity is lower
than other source identication methods, which are normally O(N2) or even O(N3).
Discussion When sampling infection time for each edge, Agaskar and Lu [1]
assume that information always spreads along the shortest paths to other nodes.
However, in the real world, information generally reaches other nodes by a random
walk. Therefore, this method may not be suitable for other propagation schemes,
such as random spreading or multicast spreading.
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3.4.3 Bayesian Estimator
Distinguished from the DMP method which adopts the message-passing propagation
model (see Section 3.3.2), F. Altarelli et al. [5] proposed using the Bayesian belief
propagation model to compute the probabilities of each node being at any state. This
method can work with dierent types of observations and in dierent propagation
scenarios, however guaranteed accuracy is only obtained in tree-like networks.
Method This method consists of three steps. The propagation of rumors are rst
presented by SI, SIR or other isomorphic models [106]. Second, given an observation
on the infection of a network, either through a group of sensors or a snapshot at an
unknown time, the belief propagation equations are derived for the posterior distri-
bution of past states on all network nodes. By constructing a factor graph based
on the original network, these equations provide the exact computation of posterior
marginal in the models. Third, belief propagation equations are iterated with time
until they converge. Nodes are then ranked according to the posterior probability of
being the source.
Analysis This method provides the exact identication of source in tree-like
networks. This method is also eective for synthetic and real networks with cycles,
both in a static and a dynamic context, and for more general networks, such as
DTN [123]. This method relies on belief propagation model in order to be used with
dierent observations and in various scenarios.
Discussion The accuracy of this method can not be guaranteed other than in
tree-like networks. Particularly for dynamically evolving networks [100], the average
success rate is only 0.53  0.06 and the average error reaches 0.76  0.23.
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3.4.4 Moon-walk Method
Xie et al. proposed a post-mortem technique on trac logs to seek the origin of a worm
(a kind of computer virus) [114]. There are four assumptions for this technique. First,
it focuses on the scanning worm [109]. This kind of worm spreads on the Internet by
making use of OS vulnerabilities. Victims will proceed to scan the whole IP space
for vulnerable hosts. Famous examples of this kind of worm includes Code Red [125]
and Slammer [66]. Second, logs of infection from sensors cover the majority of the
propagation processes. Third, the worm propagation forms a tree-like structure from
its origin. Last, the attack ows of a worm do not use spoofed source IP addresses.
Method Based on trac logs, the network communication between end-hosts are
modeled by a directed host contact graph. Propagation paths are then created by
sampling edges from the graph according to the time of corresponding logs. The
creation of each path stops when there is no contiguous edge within t seconds to
continue the path. As the sampling is performed, a count is kept of how many times
each edge from the contact graph is traversed. If the worm propagation follows a
tree-like structure, the edge with maximum count will most likely be the top of the
tree. The start of this directed edge will be considered as the propagation source.
Analysis There are several issues on this technique that need to be further ana-
lyzed. First, it is reasonable to assume worm do not use the IP spoof technique. In
the real world, the overwhelming majority of worm trac involved in propagation is
initiated by victims instead of the original attacker. Spoofed IP addresses would only
decrease the number of successful attacks without providing further anonymity to the
attacker. Second, IP trace back techniques [93] are related to Moonwalk and other
methods discussed in this article. However, trace back on its own is not sucient to
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track worms to their origin, as trace back only determines the true source of the IP
packets received by a destination. In an epidemic attack, the source of these packets
is almost never the origin of the attack, but just one of the many infected victims.
The methods introduced in this article are still needed to nd the hosts higher up
in the propagation casual trees. Third, this method relies only on trac logs. This
feature benets itself on its ability to work without any a priori knowledge about the
worm attack.
Discussion Nowadays, the number of scanning worms has largely decreased due
to advances in OS development and security techniques [112]. Therefore, the usage
of Moonwalk, which can only seek the propagation origin of the scanning worm, is
largely limited. Moreover, a full collection of infection logs is hardly achieved in the
real world. Finally, current computer viruses are normally distributed by Botnet [124].
Moonwalk, which can only seek single origin, may not be helpful in this scenario.
3.4.5 Four-metric Method
Seo et al. [94] proposed a four-metric source estimator to identify single source node
in directed networks. They assume propagation follows the SI model. The sensor
nodes who transited from susceptible states to infected states are regarded as positive
sensors. Otherwise, they are considered as negative sensors.
Method Seo et al. [94] use the intuition that the source node must be close to the
positive sensor nodes, but far away from the negative sensor nodes. They propose four
metrics to locate the source. First, they nd out a set of nodes which are reachable to
all positive sensors. Second, they lter the set of nodes by choosing the ones with the
minimum sum of distances to all positive sensor nodes. Third, they further choose the
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nodes that are reachable to the minimum number of negative sensor nodes. Finally,
the node which satises all of the above three metrics and has the maximum sum of
distances to all negative sensor nodes is considered as the source node.
Analysis Seo et al. [94] studied and compared dierent methods of choosing sen-
sors, such as randomly choosing (Random), choosing the nodes with high betweenness
centrality values (BC ), choosing the nodes with a large number of incoming edges
(NI ), and choosing the nodes which are at least d hops away from each other (Dist).
Dierent sensor selection methods produce dierent sets of sensor nodes, and have
dierent accuracies in source identication. They show that the NI and BC sensor
selection methods outperform the others.
Discussion For the four-metric source estimator, it needs to compute the short-
est paths from the sensors to any potential source. Generally, the computational
complexity is O(N3). It is too computationally expensive to use this method.
3.5 Comparative Study
In order to have a numerical understanding of the existing methods of source identi-
cation, we examine the methods under dierent experiment environments. Further-
more, we analyze potential impact factors on the accuracy of source identication.
We test the methods on both synthetic and real-world networks. All the experiments
were conducted on a desktop computer running Microsoft Windows7 with 2 CPUs
and 4G memory. The implementation was done in Matlab2012.
For each category of observation, we examined one or two typical source identi-
cation methods. In total, ve methods were examined. For complete observation,
we tested the rumor center method and the dynamic-age method. We also tested the
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Figure 3.4: Sample topologies of two synthetic networks. (A) 3-regular tree; (B) small-
world network.
Jordan center method and the DMP method for snapshots of networks. The Gaus-
sian source estimator was examined for sensor observation. In the experiments, we
typically choose infection probability (q) to be 0.75 and recovery probability (p) to
be 0.5. We randomly choose a node as a source to initiate a propagation, and then
average the error distance  between the estimated sources and the true sources by
100 runs.
3.5.1 Comparison on Synthetic Networks
In this subsection, we rst compare the performance of dierent source identication
methods on synthetic networks. Then, we study three potential impact factors (net-
work topology, propagation scheme and infection probability) on the accuracies of
the methods.
43
! " # $ % & ' ( ) * "! "" "#
!
!+&
"
,
-.
/
0
.
1
2
3
! " # $ % & ' ( ) * "! "" "#
!
!+&
"
,
-.
/
0
.
1
2
3
! " # $ % & ' ( ) * "! "" "#
!
!+&
"
,
-.
/
0
.
1
2
3
! " # $ % & ' ( ) * "! "" "#
!
!+&
"
,
-.
/
0
.
1
2
3
! " # $ % & ' ( ) * "! "" "#
!
!+&
"
,
-.
/
0
.
1
2
3
4--5-6789:;12.
<0=5-62.1:.-
>31;=826;?.
@5-7;162.1:.-
>AB
C;0998;1
<0=5-62.1:.-
(A) 4-regular tree
! " # $ % & ' ( ) * "! "" "# "$ "% "& "'
!
!+&
"
,
-.
/
0
.
1
2
3
! " # $ % & ' ( ) * "! "" "# "$ "% "& "'
!
!+&
"
,
-.
/
0
.
1
2
3
! " # $ % & ' ( ) * "! "" "# "$ "% "& "'
!
!+&
"
,
-.
/
0
.
1
2
3
! " # $ % & ' ( ) * "! "" "# "$ "% "& "'
!
!+&
"
,
-.
/
0
.
1
2
3
! " # $ % & ' ( ) * "! "" "# "$ "% "& "'
!
!+&
4--5-6789:;12.
,
-.
/
0
.
1
2
3
<0=5-62.1:.-
>31;=826;?.
@5-7;162.1:.-
>AB
C;0998;1
(B) Small-world network
Figure 3.5: Crosswise comparison of existing methods on two synthetic networks.
Crosswise Comparison
We conducted experiments on two synthetic networks: a regular tree [95] and a small-
world network [108]. Fig. 3.4(A) and Fig. 3.4(B) show example topologies of a
3-regular tree and a small-world network. Fig. 3.5(A) shows the frequency of error
distances  of dierent methods on a 4-regular tree, respectively. We can see that,
the sources estimated by the DMP method and the Jordan center method are the
closest to the true sources, with an average of 1.5-2 hops away. The rumor center
method and the Gaussian method estimate the sources with an average of 2-3 hops
away from the true sources. The sources estimated using the dynamic age method
were the farthest away from the true sources. Fig. 3.5(B) shows the performances
of dierent methods on a small-world network. It is clear the Jordan center method
outperforms the others, with estimated sources around 1 hop away from the true
sources. The DMP method also exposes good performances by showing estimated
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sources are an average of 1-2 hops away from the true sources. The dynamic age
method and Gaussian method have the worst performance.
Numerical Results: From the experiment results on the regular tree and small-
world network, we can see that the DMP method and the Jordan center method have
better performance than the other methods.
The Impact of Network Topology
In Sections 3.2-3.4, we know that some existing methods of source identication are
considered on tree-like networks. In the previous subsection, we have shown the
results of methods implemented on regular trees and small-world networks. In order
to analyze the impact of network topology on the methods, we introduce another two
dierent network topologies: random trees and regular graphs : We further conduct
performance evaluation on these two topologies.
Fig. 3.6(A) shows the experiment results of methods on a random tree. It is clear
the Jordan center method has the best performance, with estimated sources around
2 hops away from the true sources. The rumor center method and the dynamic
age method show similar performance, with estimated sources around 3 hops away
from the true sources. The DMP method and the Gaussian method have the worst
performance. Fig. 3.6(B) shows the experiment results of methods on a regular graph.
It shows that sources estimated by using the Jordan center method and the DMP
method were the closest to the true sources. The sources estimated by the rumor
center method were the farthest from true sources. The dynamic age method and the
Gaussian method also show poor performance in this scenario.
Numerical Results: From the experiment results on the four dierent network
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Figure 3.6: The impact of network topologies.
topologies, we can see the source identication methods are sensitive to network
topology.
The Impact of Propagation Scheme
From Sections 3.2-3.4, we know that some existing methods of source identication
are based on the assumption that information propagates along the BFS trees in
networks. This means propagation follows the broadcast scheme. However, in the
real world, propagation may follow various propagation schemes. We focus on three
most common propagation schemes: snowball, random walk and contact process [15].
Their denitions are given below.
 Random Walk: A node can deliver a message randomly to one of its neighbors.
 Contact Process: A node can deliver a message to a group of its neighbors that
have expressed interest in receiving the message.
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Figure 3.7: Illustration of dierent propagation schemes. The black node stands for the
source. The numbers indicate the hierarchical sequence of nodes getting infected.
 Snowball Spreading: A node can deliver a message to all of its neighbors.
An illustration of these three propagation schemes is shown in Fig. 3.7. We examine
dierent propagation schemes on both regular trees and small-world networks.
Fig. 3.8(A) shows the experiment results of the methods with propagation follow-
ing the random-walk propagation scheme on a 4-regular tree. It is clear the Gaussian
source estimator outperforms the others, with estimated sources around 1-2 hops away
from the true sources. The performances of the rumor center method, the dynamic
age method and the Jordan center method are similar to each other, with estimated
sources around 5 hops away from the true sources. The DMP method has the worst
performance. Fig. 3.9(A) shows experiment results of the methods with propagation
following the contact-process propagation scheme on a 4-regular tree. It is clear the
results in Fig. 3.8(A) and Fig. 3.9(A) are similar to each other. This means the
methods have similar performances on both the random-walk and contact-process
propagation schemes. Fig. 3.10(A) shows the experiment results of the methods with
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Figure 3.8: The impact of propagation schemes: random-walk scheme.
propagation following the snowball propagation scheme on a 4-regular tree. The re-
sults show a big dierence from the results of the previous two propagation schemes.
The DMP method and the Jordan center method outperformed the others, with
estimated sources around 1-2 hops away from the true sources. The rumor center
method and the Gaussian method also showed good performances, with estimated
sources around 2-3 hops away from the true sources. The dynamic age method had
the worst performance.
The experiment results of the methods with propagation following dierent prop-
agation schemes on a small-world network are shown in Fig. 3.8(B), Fig. 3.9(B) and
Fig. 3.10(B). The results are dramatically dierent from the results on the 4-regular
tree. From Fig. 3.9 we can see the Gaussian source estimator obtains the best per-
formance, followed by the DMP method. The rumor center method, the dynamic age
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Figure 3.9: The impact of propagation schemes: contact-process scheme.
method and the Jordan center method show identifying sources by randomly choos-
ing. From Fig. 3.9(B), it is clear the Jordan center method, the DMP method and
the Gaussian method show similar performances. These three methods outperform
the others. From Fig. 3.10(B) we can see the Jordan center method outperforms the
others, with estimated sources around 1 hop away from the true sources. The sources
estimated using the DMP method are around 1-2 hops away from the true sources.
The Gaussian source estimator has the worst performance.
Numerical Results: From the experiment results, we see the source identi-
cation methods are also sensitive to propagation schemes. The methods of source
identication show better performance when propagation follows the snowball propa-
gation scheme rather than the random-walk or contact-process propagation schemes.
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Figure 3.10: The impact of propagation schemes: snowball scheme.
The Impact of Infection Probability
In this subsection, we will analyze the impact of infection probability on the accuracy
of source identication. We set the infection probability from 0.5 to 0.95.
The experiment results are shown in Fig. 3.11(A) and Fig. 3.11(B). From these
gures, we can see that the rumor center method have similar performances when we
change the infection probability. The same phenomenon happens on the dynamic age
method, the Jordan center method and the Gaussian methods. The DMP method
performs best when infection probability q is equal to 0.5. The accuracy declines
when q increases to 0.95. Among the experiment results, the Jordan center method
and the DMP method outperform the other methods, with estimated sources around
1 hop away from the true sources. The dynamic age method and the Gaussian method
have the worst performance.
Numerical Results: From the experiment results, we can see only the DMP
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Figure 3.11: The impact of infection probability.
method is sensitive to the infection probability and performs better when the infection
probability is lower. The other methods show slightly dierence in their performance
when applied with various infection probabilities.
3.5.2 Comparison on Real-world Networks
In this subsection, we examine the methods of source identication on two real-world
networks. The rst one is an Enron email network [41]. This network has 143 nodes
and 1,246 edges. On average, each node has 8.71 edges. Therefore, the Enron email
network is a dense network. The second is a power grid network [3]. This network
has 4,941 nodes and 6,594 edges. On average, each node has 1.33 edges. Therefore,
the power grid network is a sparse network. Sample topologies of these two real-world
networks are shown in Fig. 3.12.
Fig. 3.13(A) shows the frequency of error distance  of dierent methods on
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Figure 3.12: Sample topologies of two real-world networks.
the Enron email network. We can see the rumor center method, the Jordan center
method and the dynamic age method outperform the others. The DMP method has
the worst performance. The Enron email network is a small and dense network, com-
plete observation of this network is reasonable and executable, and the identication
accuracy is also acceptable. Fig. 3.13(B) shows the experiment results on the power
grid network. It is clear the Jordan center method and the DMP method outperform
the others, with estimated sources around 1-2 hops away from the true sources. The
rumor center method and the Gaussian method show similar performance, with esti-
mated sources around 2-4 hops away from the true sources. The dynamic age method
has the worst performance.
Numerical Results: From the experiment results, we can see the accuracies
of the methods are greatly dierent between these two real-world networks. For
the Enron email network, the rumor center method and the dynamic age method
outperform the other methods, while the DMP method has the worst performance.
However, for the power grid network, the DMP method and the Jordan center have
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Figure 3.13: Source identication methods applied on real networks.
the best performance
3.5.3 Summary
We summarize the source identication methods in this subsection. Based on the
content in Sections 3.2-3.4, it is clear that current methods rely on either the topo-
logical centrality measures or the measures of the distance between the observations
and mathematical estimations of the propagation.
In Table 3.1, we collect seven features from the methods discussed in this article.
A detailed summary on each feature is elaborated as follows:
1. Topology: As shown in Table 3.1, a signicant part the focus for current method-
s is tree-like topology. These methods can deal with generic network topologies
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by using the BFS technique to reconstruct generic networks into trees. Accord-
ing to comparative studies in Section 3.5, methods on dierent topologies show
a great variety of accuracy in seeking origins.
2. Observation: Based on the analysis in Sections 3.2-3.5, the category of observa-
tion is not a deterministic factor on the accuracy of source identication. The
accuracy of each method varies according to the dierent conditions and sce-
narios. In the real world, complete observation is generally dicult to achieve.
Snapshot and sensor observation are normally more realistic.
3. Model: The majority of methods employ SI model to present the propagation
dynamics of risks. The SI model only considers the susceptible and infected
states of nodes regardless of the recovery process. The extension to SIR/SIS
will increase the complexity of source identication methods. Jordan center and
Monte Carlo method is based on SIR/SIS model. In particular, the Bayesian
source estimator can be used in scenarios with various propagation models as
the belief propagation approach can estimate the probabilities of node states
under various conditions.
4. Source: Most methods focus on single source identication. The multi-rumor
center method and eigenvector center method can be used to identify multi-
ple sources. However, these two methods are too computationally expensive to
be implemented. In the real world, risks are normally distributed from multi-
ple sources. For example, attackers generally employ a botnet which contains
thousands of victims to help spread the computer virus [8,28]. For source iden-
tication, these victims are the propagation origins.
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5. Probability: For simplicity, earlier methods consider the infection probabilities
to be identical among the edges in networks. Later, most methods are ex-
tended to varied infection probabilities among dierent edges. Noticeably, this
extension makes source identication methods more realistic.
6. Time Delay: Only the methods under sensor observations consider time delay
for edges. Accurate time delay of risks is an important factor in the propa-
gation [18]. It is important to consider the time delay in source identication
techniques.
7. Complexity: Most current methods are too computationally expensive to quick-
ly capture the sources of propagation. The complexity ranges from O(N logN=")
to O(Nk). In fact, the complexity of methods dominates the speed of seeking
origins. Quickly identifying propagation sources in most cases is of great signif-
icance in the real world, such as capturing the culprits of rumors. Future work
is needed to improve the identication speed.
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Chapter 4
Rumor Source Identication in
Time-varying Networks
4.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on identifying rumor sources in time-varying networks, particu-
larly time-varying social networks. The proposed method can also be applied in other
types of time-varying networks. Rumor spreading in social networks has long been a
critical threat to our society [79]. Nowadays, with the development of mobile devices
and wireless techniques, the temporal characteristic of social networks (time-varying
social networks) has deeply inuenced the dynamic information diusion process oc-
curring on top of them [87]. The ubiquity and easy access of time-varying social
networks not only promote the eciency of information diusion but also dramati-
cally accelerate the speed of rumor spreading [44, 104].
For either forensic or defensive purposes, it has always been a signicant work
to identify the source of rumors in time-varying social networks [21]. However, the
existing techniques for rumor source identication generally require rm connections
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between individuals (i.e., static networks), so that administrators can trace back a-
long the determined connections to reach the diusion sources. For example, many
methods rely on identifying spanning trees in networks [58, 95, 107], then the roots
of the spanning trees are regarded as the rumor sources. The rm connections be-
tween users are the premise of constructing spanning trees in these methods. Some
other methods detect rumor sources by measuring node centralities, such as degree,
betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centralities [82,120]. The individual who has
the maximum centrality value is considered as the rumor source. All of these cen-
trality measures are based on static networks. Time-varying social networks, where
the involved users and interactions always change, have led to great challenges to the
traditional rumor source identication techniques.
In this chapter, a novel source identication method is proposed to overcome the
challenges, which consists the following three steps.
(i) To represent a time-varying social network, we reduce it to a sequence of static
networks, each aggregating all edges and nodes present in a time-integrating window.
This is the case, for instance, of rumors spreading in Bluetooth networks, for which
the ne-grained temporal resolution is not available, whose spreading can be studied
through dierent integrating windows t (e.g., t could be minutes, hours, days or
even months). In each integrating window, if users did not activate the Bluetooth
on their devices (i.e., oine), they would not receive or spread the rumors. If they
moved out the bluetooth coverage of their communities (i.e., physical mobility), they
would not receive or spread the rumors.
(ii) Similar to the detective routine in criminology, a small set of suspects will
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be identied by adopting a reverse dissemination process to narrow down the scale
of the source seeking area. The reverse dissemination process distributes copies of
rumors reversely from the users whose states have been determined based on various
observations upon the networks. The ones who can simultaneously receive all copies
of rumors from the infected users are supposed to be the suspects of the real sources.
(iii) To determine the real source from the suspects, we employ a microscopic
rumor spreading model to analytically estimate the probabilities of each user being
in dierent states in each time window. Since this model allows the time-varying
connections among users, it can feature the dynamics of each user. More specically,
assuming any suspect as the rumor source, we can obtain the probabilities of the
observed users to be in their observed states. Then, for any suspect, we can calculate
the maximum likelihood (ML) of obtaining the observation. The one who can provide
the maximum ML will be considered as the real rumor source.
The major contribution of this chapter is three-fold.
 We adopt a reverse dissemination method to narrow the scale of the source seek-
ing area. Compared with the previous methods which scan the entire network,
our proposed method signicantly promotes the eciency of source identica-
tion.
 We introduce a novel ML-based algorithm that can overcome the connection-
always-changing challenge through a novel rumor spreading model in time-
varying social networks.
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 Experiment results show signicant advantages of our method in the identica-
tion of rumor sources, the estimation of spreading time, and the prediction of
infection scale of rumors.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the preliminary
knowledge of source identication in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the details
of the reverse dissemination method. We elaborate upon the ML-based algorithm
in Section 4.4, followed by Section 4.5 which shows a series of evaluations on our
method. Section 4.6 concludes some remarks in this chapter.
4.2 Time-varying Social Networks
In this section, we introduce the primer for rumor source identication in time-varying
social networks, including the features of time-varying social networks, the state tran-
sition of users when they hear a rumor, and the categorization of partial observations
in time-varying social networks.
4.2.1 Time-varying Topology
The essence of social networks lies in its time-varying nature. For example, the neigh-
borhood of individuals moving over a geographic space evolves over time (i.e., phys-
ical mobility), and the interaction between the individuals appears and disappears
in online social networks (i.e., online/oine) [87]. Time-varying social networks
are dened by an ordered stream of interactions between individuals. In other words,
as time progresses, the interaction structure keeps changing. Examples can be found
in both face-to-face interaction networks [13], and online social networks [104]. The
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Figure 4.1: Example of a rumor spreading in a time-varying network. The random spread
is located on the black node, and can travel on the links depicted as line arrows in the time
windows. Dashed lines represent links that are present in the system in each time window.
temporal nature of such networks has a deep inuence on information spreading on
top of them. Indeed, the spreading of rumors is aected by duration, sequence, and
concurrency of contacts among people.
In this work, we reduce time-varying networks to a series of static networks by
introducing a time-integrating window. Each integrating window aggregates all edges
and nodes present in the corresponding time duration. In Fig. 4.1, we show an
example to illustrate the time-integrating windows. In the time window t   1 (or,
at time t   1), a rumor started to spread from node S who had interaction with 5
neighbors in this time window. In the next time window t, nodes B, D and F were
successfully infected. In this time window, we notice that node O moved next to
B (i.e., physical mobility), and node G had no interaction with its neighbors (i.e.,
oine). Other examples of physical mobility or online/oine status of nodes can be
found in the time window t+ 1.
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Sus. Inf.v(i,t)1−v(i,t)
1−q(i)
infected recovered
Recq(i)
Con. Mis.1 q(i)v(i,t)
1−q(i)sub-states of Inf.
q(i)
Figure 4.2: State transition of a node in rumor spreading model.
4.2.2 Security States of Individuals
For the convenience of description, we borrow the notions from epidemiology to de-
scribe the spreading of rumors in time-varying social networks [126]. We say a user is
infected when he/she accepts the rumors, and an infected user is recovered if he/she
abandons the rumors. In this chapter, we adopt the classic susceptible-infected-
recovered (SIR) scheme to present the infection dynamics of each user. Fig. 4.2
shows the state transition graph of an arbitrary user in this model. Every user is
initially susceptible (Sus.). They can be infected (Inf.) by their neighbors with prob-
ability v(i; t), and then recover (Rec.) with probability q(i). Rumors will be spread
out from infected users to their social neighbors until they get recovered. There are
also many other models of rumor propagation, including the SI, SIS, SIRS model-
s [60, 67, 117]. In present work, we adopt the SIR model because it can reect the
state transition of users when they hear a rumor, from being susceptible to being
recovered. Generally, people will not believe the rumor again after they know the
truth. Therefore, recovered users will not transit their states any more. For other
propagation models, readers can refer to Section 4.6 for further discussion.
To more precisely describe node states under dierent types of observations, we
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Figure 4.3: Three types of observations in regards to the rumor spreading in Fig. 4.1. (A)
Wavefront; (B) Snapshot; (C) Sensor.
introduce two sub-states of nodes being infected: `contagious' (Con.) and `misled'
(Mis.), see Fig. 4.2. An infected node rst becomes contagious and then transit to
being misled. The Con. state describes the state of nodes newly infected. More
specically, a node is Con. at time t means this node is susceptible at time t  1 but
becomes infected at time t. An misled node will stay being infected until it recovers.
For instance, sensors can record the time at which they get infected, and the infection
time is crucial in detecting rumor sources because it reects the infection trend and
speed of a rumor. Hence, the introduction of contagious and misled states is intrinsic
to the rumor spreading framework.
4.2.3 Observations on Time-varying Social Netowrks
Prior knowledge for source identication is provided by various types of partial ob-
servations upon time-varying social networks. According to previous work on static
networks, we collect three categories of partial observations: wavefronts, snapshots,
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and sensor observations. We denote the set of observed nodes as O = fo1; o2; :::; ong.
Following the rumor spreading in Fig. 4.1, we will explain each type of the partial
observations as follows.
Wavefront [12]: Given a rumor spreading incident, a wavefront provides partial
knowledge of the time-varying social network status. Only the users who are in the
wavefront of the spreading can be observed (i.e., all the contagious nodes in the latest
time window are observed). Fig. 4.3(A) shows an example of the wavefront in the
rumor spreading in Fig. 4.1. We see that nodes C;E; I;K and O are in the wavefront
as they transit to being contagious at time t+ 1.
Snapshot [58]: Given a rumor spreading incident, a snapshot also provides partial
knowledge of the time-varying social network status. In this case, only a group of
users can be observed in the latest time window when the snapshot is taken. The
states of the observed users can be susceptible, infected or recovered. We use OS,
OI and OR to denote the observed users who are susceptible, infected or recovered,
respectively. This type of observations is the most common one in our daily life. Fig.
4.3(B) shows an example of the snapshot in the rumor spreading in Fig. 4.1 . We see
that OS = fN;Q; T; V g, OI = fF; I;K;Og and OR = ;.
Sensor Observation [82]: Sensors are a group of preselected users in time-varying
social networks. The sensors can record the rumor spreading dynamics over them,
including the security states and the time window when they get infected (more specif-
ically, become contagious). We introduce OS and OI to denote the set of susceptible
and infected sensors, respectively. For each oi 2 OI , the infection time is denoted by
ti. This type of observation is usually obtained from sensor networks. Fig. 4.3(C)
shows an example of the sensor observations in the rumor spreading in Fig. 4.1. In
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this case, OS = fN;P; T; V g, OI = fK;Bg, and the infection time of node K is t+1,
and node B is infected at time t.
We can see that these three types of partial observations provide three dierent
categories of partial knowledge of the time-varying social network status. Dierent
types of observations are suitable for dierent circumstances in real-world application-
s. Readers can refer to [12,82,120] for further discussion on dierent types of partial
observations. The partial knowledge together with the time-varying characteristics
of social networks make the tracing back of rumor sources much more dicult.
4.3 Narrowing Down the Suspects
Current methods of source identication need to scan every node in the underlying
network. This is a bottlenecks of identifying rumor sources: scalability. It is necessary
to narrow down a set of suspects, especially in large-scale networks. In this section,
we develop a reverse dissemination method to identify a small set of suspects. The
details of the method are presented in Section 4.3.1, and its eciency will be evaluated
in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.1 Reverse Dissemination Method
In this subsection, we rst present the rationale of the reverse dissemination method.
Then, we show how to apply the reverse dissemination method into dierent types of
partial observations on networks.
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of the reverse dissemination process in regards to the wavefront
observation in Fig. 4.3 (A). (A) The observed nodes broadcast labeled copies of rumors to
their neighbors in time window t; (B) The neighbors who received labeled copies will relay
them to their own neighbors in time window t  1.
Rationale
The rationale of the reverse dissemination method is to send copies of rumors along
the reversed dynamic connections from observed nodes to exhaust all possible spread-
ing paths leading to the observation. The node from which all the paths, covering
all the observed nodes' states, originated is more likely to be a suspect. The reverse
dissemination method is inspired from the Jordan method [120]. The reverse dissem-
ination method is dierent from the Jordan method, because our method is based
on time-varying social networks (involving the physical mobility and online/oine
status of users) rather than static networks. In Fig. 4.4, we show a simple exam-
ple to illustrate the reverse dissemination process. This example follows the rumor
spreading in Fig. 4.1 and the wavefront observation in Fig. 4.3(A). All wavefront
nodes OI = fE;C; I;K;Og observed in time window t + 1 are labeled as black in
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Fig. 4.4 (A). The whole process is composed of two rounds of reverse dissemination.
In round 1 (Fig. 4.4 (A)), all observed nodes broadcast labeled copies reversely to
their neighbors in time window t. For example, nodes S and O received copies of
node C (S;O  C), and node D received copies of three observed nodes C; I and K
(D  C; I;K). In round 2 (Fig. 4.4 (B)), the neighbors who have received labeled
copies will relay them to other neighbors in time window t   1. In each round, the
labels will be recorded in each relay node. We can see from Fig. 4.4(B) that node S
has received all copies from all the observed nodes (S  C;E;K; I; O). Then, node
S is chosen to be a suspect.
We notice that the starting time for each observed node starting their reverse
dissemination processes varies in dierent types of observations. For a wavefront, since
all the observed nodes are supposed to be contagious in the latest time window, all
the observed nodes need to simultaneously start their reverse dissemination processes.
For a snapshot, the observed nodes stay in their states in the latest time window.
Therefore, the reverse dissemination processes will also simultaneously starts from all
the observed nodes. However, for a sensor observation, because the infected sensors
record their infection time, the starting time of reverse dissemination for each sensor
will be determined by ti. More specically, the latest infected sensors rst start their
reverse dissemination processes, and then the sensors infected in the previous time
window, until the very rst infected sensors.
Wavefront
Given a reverse dissemination process starting from an observed node oi, we use
PC(u; tjoi) to denote the probability of an arbitrary node u to be contagious after
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time t, where t denotes the time span of the whole reverse dissemination process.
Let all observed nodes oi start their reverse dissemination processes in the latest time
window. To match the wavefront, it is expected a suspect u can simultaneously receive
rumor copies from all oi 2 O (i.e., the rumor copies sent from all observed nodes can
make node u become contagious simultaneously). Mathematically, we identify those
nodes who can provide the maximum likelihood, L(u; t), of being a suspect receiving
copies from all the observed nodes, as in
L(u; t) =
X
oi2O
ln(PC(u; tjoi)): (4.3.1)
For the convenience of computation, we adopt logarithmic function ln() in Eq. (4.3.1)
to derive the maximum likelihood. We use U to denote the set of suspects. The ones
who provide larger values of L(u; t) are recognized as a member of set U .
Snapshot
To match the snapshot observation (which includes susceptible, infected or recovered
nodes), it is expected that a suspect u needs to satisfy the following three principles at
time t. First, copies of rumors disseminated from observed susceptible nodes oi 2 OS
cannot reach node u at time t (i.e., u is still susceptible). Second, copies of rumors
disseminated from observed infected nodes oj 2 OI can reach node u at time t (i.e.,
u becomes infected). Third, copies of rumors disseminated from observed recovered
nodes ok 2 OR can arrive at node u before time t (i.e., u becomes recovered). Again,
we employ maximum likelihood to capture this kind of nodes, as in
L(u; t) =
X
oi2OS
ln(PS(u; tjoi)) +
X
oj2OI
ln(PI(u; tjoj))
+
X
ok2OR
ln(PR(u; tjok));
(4.3.2)
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where PS(u; tjoi), PI(u; tjoi) and PR(u; tjoi) denote the probabilities of u to be sus-
ceptible, infected or recovered after time t, respectively, given that the reverse dis-
semination started from oi.
Sensor
For sensor observations, according to our previous discussion, we let infected sensor
oi 2 OI start to reversely disseminate copies of the rumor at time t^i = T   ti,
where T = maxftijoi 2 OIg. We also let the susceptible sensors oj 2 OS start to
reversely disseminate copies of rumors at time t=0. To match a sensor observation, it
is expected a suspect u needs to satisfy the following two principles at time t. First,
copies of rumors disseminated from susceptible sensors oi 2 OS cannot reach node
u at time t (i.e., node u is still susceptible). Second, copies of rumors disseminated
from all infected sensors oj 2 OI can be received by node u at time t (i.e., node u
becomes contagious). Mathematically, we determine the suspects by computing their
maximum likelihood, as in
L(u; t) =
X
oi2OI
ln(PC(u; t+ t^ijoi))
+
X
oj2OS
ln(PS(u; tjoj)):
(4.3.3)
The values of PS(u; tjoi), PC(u; tjoi), PI(u; tjoi) and PR(u; tjoi) will be calculated
by the model introduced in Section 4.4.2. We summarize the reverse dissemination
method in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Reverse dissemination
Input: A set of observed nodes O = fo1; o2; :::; ong, a set of infection times of the observed
nodes ft1; t2; :::; tng, a threshold , and a threshold tmax.
Initialize: A set of suspects U = ;, and t1 = ::: = tn = T if O is a snapshot/wavefront,
otherwise T = maxft1; t2; :::; tng.
for (t starts from 1 to a given maximum value tmax) do
for (oi: i starts from 1 to n) do
if (oi has not started to disseminate the rumor) then
Start to propagate the rumor from user oi separately and independently at time
t+ T   ti.
for (u: any node in the whole network) do
if (user u received n separate rumors from O) then
Compute the maximum likelihood L(u; t) for user u;
Add user u into the set U .
if (jU j N) then
Keep the rst N suspects with large maximum likelihoods in U , and delete all the
other suspects.
Stop.
Output: A set of suspects U .
4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of the reverse dissemination method in real time-varying
social networks. Similar to Lokhov et. al's work [51], we consider the infection
probabilities and recovery probabilities to be uniformly distributed in (0,1), and the
average infection and recovery probabilities are set to be 0.6 and 0.3. We also use 
to denote the ratio of suspects over all nodes,  = jU j=N , where N is the number of
all nodes in a time-varying social network. The value of  ranges from 5% to 100%.
We randomly choose the real source in 100 runs of each experiment. The number of
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100 comes from the wrok in [126].
We consider four real time-varying social networks in Table 4.1: The MIT reali-
ty [24] dataset captures communication from 97 subjects at MIT over the course of
the 2004-2005 academic year. The Sigcom09 [81] dataset contains the traces of Blue-
tooth device proximity of 76 persons during SIGCOMM 2009 conference in Barcelona,
Spain. The Enron Email [98] dataset contains record of email conversations from 143
users in 2001. The Facebook [105] dataset contains communications from 45,813 user-
s during December 29th, 2008 and January 3rd, 2009. All of these datasets reect
the physical mobility and online/oine features of time-varying social networks. Ac-
cording to the study in [87], an appropriate temporal resolution t is important to
correctly characterize the dynamical processes on time-varying networks. Therefore,
we need to be cautious when we choose the time interval of size t. Furthermore,
many social networks have been shown small-world, i.e., the average distance l be-
tween any two nodes is small, generally l  6. Previous extensive works show that
rumors can spread quickly in social networks, generally after 6-10 time ticks of prop-
agation (see [21]). Hence, we divided the social networks into 6-10 time windows.
Therefore, for the datasets used in this chapter, we uniformly divide each into 6-10
discrete time windows [87]. For other division of temporal resolution, readers could
Table 4.1: Comparison of Data Collected in the Experiments.
Dataset MIT Sigcom09 Email Facebook
Device Phone Phone Laptop Laptop
Network type Bluetooth Bluetooth WiFi WiFi
Duration (days) 246 5 14 6
# of devices 97 76 143 45,813
# of contacts 54,667 69,189 1,246 264,004
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Figure 4.5: Accuracy of the reverse dissemination method in networks. (A) MIT; (B)
Sigcom09; (C) Enron Email; (D) Facebook.
refer to [87] for further discussion.
Fig. 4.5 shows the experiment results in the four real datasets. We nd the
proposed method works quite well in reducing the number of suspects. Especially
for snapshots, the searching scale can be narrowed to 5% of all users for the MIT
dataset, 15% for the Sigcom09 dataset, and 20% for the Enron Email and Facebook
datasets. The number of suspects can be reduced to 45% of all users in the MIT
reality dataset under snapshot and wavefront observations. For the Enron Email and
Facebook datasets, the number of suspects can be reduced to 20% of all users. The
worst case occurred in the Sigcom09 dataset with wavefronts, but our method still
achieved a reduction of 35% in the total number of users.
The experiment results on real time-varying social networks show that the pro-
posed method is ecient in narrowing down the suspects. Real-world social networks
usually have a large number of users. Our proposed method addresses the scalability
in source identication, and therefore is of great signicance.
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4.4 Determining the Real Source
Another bottleneck of identifying rumor sources is to design a good measure to specify
the real source. Most of the existing methods are based on node centralities, which
ignore the propagation probabilities between nodes. Some other methods consider
the BFS trees instead of the original networks. These violate the rumor spreading
processes. In this section, we adopt an innovative maximum-likelihood based method
to identify the real source from the suspects. A novel rumor spreading model will also
be introduced to model rumor spreading in time-varying social networks.
4.4.1 A Maximum-likelihood (ML) Based Method
Rationale
The key idea of the ML-based method is to expose the suspect from set U that pro-
vides the largest maximum likelihood to match the observation. It is expected that
the real source will produce a rumor propagation which not only temporally but also
spatially matches the observation more than other suspects. Given an observation
O = fo1; o2; :::; ong in a time-varying network, we let the spread of rumors start from
an arbitrary suspect u 2 U from the time window that is tu before the latest time
window. For an arbitrary observed node oi, we use PS(oi; tuju) to denote the proba-
bility of oi being susceptible at time tu, given that the spread of rumors starts from
suspect u. Similarly, we have PC(oi; tuju), PI(oi; tuju) and PR(oi; tuju) representing
the probabilities of oi being contagious, infected and recovered at time tu, respectively.
We use ~L(tu; u) to denote the maximum likelihood of obtaining the observation when
the rumor started from suspect u. Among all the suspects in U , we can estimate the
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real source by choosing the maximum value of the ML, as in
(u; t) = arg maxu2U ~L(tu; u): (4.4.1)
The result of Eq. (4.4.1) suggests that suspect u can provide a rumor propagation
not only temporally but also spatially matches the observation better than other
suspects. We also have an estimation of infection scale I(t; u) as a byproduct, as in
I(t; u) =
NX
i=1
PI(i; t
ju): (4.4.2)
Later, we can justify the eectiveness of the ML-based method by examining the
accuracy of t and I(t; u).
Wavefront
In a wavefront, all observed nodes are contagious in the time window when the wave-
front is captured. Supposing suspect u is the rumor source, the maximum likelihood
~L(tu; u) of obtaining the wavefront O is the product of the probabilities of any ob-
served node oi 2 O being contagious after time tu. We also adopt a logarithmic
function to present the computation of the maximum likelihood. Then, we have
~L(tu; u) for a wavefront, as in
~L(tu; u) =
X
oi2O
ln(PC(oi; tuju)): (4.4.3)
Snapshot
In a snapshot, the observed nodes can be susceptible, infected or recovered in the time
window when the snapshot is taken. Supposing suspect u is the rumor source, the
maximum likelihood of obtaining the snapshot is the product of the probabilities of
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any observed node oi 2 O being in its observed state. Then, we have the logarithmic
form of the calculation for ~L(tu; u) in a snapshot, as in
~L(tu; u) =
X
oi2OS
ln(PS(oi; tuju))+X
oj2OI
ln(PI(oj; tuju)) +
X
ok2OR
ln(PR(ok; tuju)):
(4.4.4)
Sensor
In a sensor observation, each infected sensor oi 2 OI records its infection time ti.
Although the absolute time ti cannot directly suggest the spreading time of the rumor,
we can derive the relative infection time of each sensor. Supposing suspect u is
the rumor source, for an arbitrary infected sensor oi, its relative infection time is
~ti = ti  ~t+ tu where ~t = minftijoi 2 OIg, and tu is obtained from Algorithm 1. For
suspect u 2 U , the maximum likelihood ~L(tu; u) of obtaining the observation is the
product of the probability of any sensor oi to be in its observed state at time ~ti. Then,
we have the logarithmic form of the calculation for ~L(tu; u) in a sensor observation,
as in
~L(tu; u) =
X
oi2OI
ln(PC(u; ~tijoi)) +
X
oj2OS
ln(PS(u; tujoj)): (4.4.5)
Note that, PS(u; tjoi), PC(u; tjoi), PI(u; tjoi), and PR(~u; tjoi) can be calculated in the
rumor spreading model in Section 4.4.2. We summarize the method of determining
rumor sources in Algorithm 2.
4.4.2 Propagation Model
In this subsection, we introduce an analytical model to present the spreading dynamics
of rumors in time-varying social networks. The state transition of each node follows
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Algorithm 2: Targeting the suspect
Input: A set of suspects U , a set of observed nodes O, and a threshold tmax.
Initialize: Lmax = 0, u
 = ;, t = 0.
for (~u: any node in set U) do
for (t starts from 1 to a given maximum value tmax) do
Disseminate the rumor from suspect ~u.
if (We can obtain the observation O) then
Compute the maximum likelihood value ~L(t; ~u).
if (~L(t; ~u) > Lmax) then
Lmax = ~L(t; ~u);
u = ~u;
t = t:
if (~L(t; ~u) < ~L(t  1; ~u)) then
Stop.
Output: The rumor source u and propagation time t.
the SIR scheme introduced in Section 4.2.2. For rumor spreading processes among
users, we use this model to calculate the probabilities of each user in various states.
In the modeling, every user is initially susceptible. We use ji(t) to denote the
spreading probability from user j to user i in time window t. Then, we can calculate
the probability of a susceptible user being infected by his/her infected neighbors as
in
v(i; t) = 1 
Y
j2Ni
[1  ji(t)  PI(j; t  1)]; (4.4.6)
where, Ni denotes the set of neighbors of user i. Then, we can compute the probability
of an arbitrary user to be susceptible at time t as in
PS(i; t) = [1  v(i; t)]  PS(i; t  1): (4.4.7)
Once a user gets infected, he/she becomes contagious. We then have the probability
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Figure 4.6: The distribution of error distance () in the MIT Reality dataset. (A) Sensor;
(B) Snapshot; (C) Wavefront.
that an arbitrary user is contagious at time t as in
PC(i; t) = v(i; t)  PS(i; t  1): (4.4.8)
Since an infected user can be either contagious or misled, we can obtain the value of
PI(i; t) as in
PI(i; t) = PC(i; t) + (1  qi(t))  PI(i; t  1): (4.4.9)
Then, the value of the PR(i; t) can be derived from
PR(i; t) = PR(i; t  1) + qi(t)  PI(i; t  1): (4.4.10)
This model analytically derives the probabilities of each user in various states in an
arbitrary time t. This in addition constitutes the maximum likelihood L(u; t) of an
arbitrary user u being a suspect in time window t in Section 4.3.1. This also supports
the calculation of the maximum likelihood ~L(t; u) to match the observation in time
window t, given that the rumor source is the suspicious user u in Section 4.4.1.
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Figure 4.7: The distribution of error distance () in the Sigcom09 dataset. (A) Sensor; (B)
Snapshot; (C) Wavefront.
4.5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the eciency of our source identication method. The
experiment settings are the same as those presented in Section 4.3.2. Specically, we
let the sampling ratio  range from 10% to 30%, as the reverse dissemination method
has already achieved a good performance with  dropping in this range.
4.5.1 Accuracy of Rumor Source Identication
We evaluate the accuracy of our method in this subsection. We use  to denote
the error distance between a real source and an estimated source. Ideally, we have
 = 0 if our method accurately captures the real source. In practice, we expect that
our method can accurately capture the real source or a user very close to the real
source (i.e.,  is very small). As the user close to the real source usually has similar
characteristics with the real source, quarantining or clarifying rumors at this user is
also very signicant to diminish the rumors [95].
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Figure 4.8: The distribution of error distance () in the Enron Email dataset. (A) Sensor;
(B) Snapshot; (C) Wavefront.
Our method shows good performances in the four real time-varying social network-
s. Fig. 4.6 shows the frequency of the error distances () in the MIT reality dataset
under dierent categories of observations. When the sampling ratio   20%, our
method can identify the real sources with an accuracy of 78% for the sensor obser-
vations, more than 60% for the snapshots, and around 36% for the wavefronts. For
the wavefronts, although our method cannot identify real sources with very high ac-
curacy, the estimated sources are very close to the real sources, and are generally 0-2
hops away. Fig. 4.7 shows the frequency of the error distances  in the Sigcom09
dataset. When the sampling ratio   20%, the proposed method can identify the
real sources with an accuracy of more than 70% for the snapshots. For the other
two categories of observations, although our method cannot identify real sources with
very high accuracy, the estimated sources are very close to the real sources, with an
average of 1-2 hops away in the sensor observations, and 1-3 hops away for the wave-
fronts. Fig. 4.8 shows the performance of our method in the Enron Email dataset.
When the sampling ratio   20%, our method can identify the real sources with
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Figure 4.9: The distribution of error distance () in the Facebook dataset. (A) Sensor; (B)
Snapshot; (C) Wavefront.
an accuracy of 80% for the snapshots, and more than 45% for the wavefronts. The
estimated sources are very close to the real sources, with an average 1-3 hops away in
the sensor observations. Fig. 4.9 shows the performance of our method in the Face-
book dataset. Similarly, when the sampling ratio   20%, the proposed method
can identify the real sources with an accuracy of around 40% for the snapshots. The
estimated sources are very close to the real sources, with an average of 1-3 hops away
from the real sources under the sensor and wavefront observations.
Compared with previous work, our proposed method is superior because our
method can work in time-varying social networks rather than static networks. Our
method can achieve around 80% of all experiment runs that accurately identify the
real source or an individual very close to the real source. However, the previous work
of [107] and [96] has theoretically proven their accuracy was at most 25% or 50% in
tree-like networks, and their average error distance is 3-4 hops away.
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Figure 4.10: The correlation between the maximum likelihood of the real sources and that
of the estimated sources in the MIT reality dataset. (A) Sensor observation; (B) Snapshot
observation; (C) Wavefront observation.
4.5.2 Eectiveness Justication
We justify the eectiveness of our ML-based method from three aspects: the cor-
relation between the ML of the real sources and that of the estimated sources, the
accuracy of estimating rumor spreading time, and the accuracy of estimating rumor
infection scale.
Correlation between real sources and estimated sources
We investigate the correlation between the real sources and the estimated sources by
examining the correlation between their maximum likelihood values. For dierent
types of observation, the maximum likelihood of an estimated source can be obtained
from Eq. (4.4.3), Eq. (4.4.4) or Eq. (4.4.5), i.e., ~L(t; u). The maximum likelihood
of a real source is obtained by replacing u and t as the real source and the real
rumor spreading time, respectively. If the estimated source is in fact the real source,
their maximum likelihood values should present high correlation.
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Figure 4.11: The correlation between the maximum likelihood of the real sources and that
of the estimated sources in the Sigcom09 dataset. (A) Sensor observation; (B) Snapshot
observation; (C) Wavefront observation.
The correlation results of the maximum likelihood values when  = 20% in the
four time-varying social networks are shown from Fig. 4.10 to Fig. 4.13. We see
that the maximum likelihood values of the real sources and that of the estimated
sources are highly correlated with each other. Their maximum likelihood values
approximately form linear relationships to each other. Fig. 4.10 shows the results in
the MIT reality dataset. We can see that the maximum likelihood values of the real
sources and that of the estimated sources are highly correlated in both sensor and
snapshot observations. The worst results occurred in wavefront observations, however
the majority of the correlation results still tend to be clustered in a line. These
exactly reect the accuracy of identifying rumor sources in Fig. 4.6. The results in
the Sigcom09 dataset are shown in Fig. 4.11. We see that the maximum likelihood
values are highly correlated in both snapshot and wavefront observations. The worst
results occurred in sensor observations, however the majority of the correlation results
still tend to be clustered in a line. These exactly reect the accuracy of identifying
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Figure 4.12: The correlation between the maximum likelihood of the real sources and that
of the estimated sources in the Enron Email dataset. (A) Sensor observation; (B) Snapshot
observation; (C) Wavefront observation.
rumor sources in Fig. 4.7. The results in the Enron Email dataset are shown in
Fig. 4.12. We see that the maximum likelihood values are highly correlated in both
snapshot and wavefront observations, and slightly correlated in sensor observations.
These exactly reect the accuracy of identifying rumor sources in Fig. 4.8. Similar
results can be found in the Facebook dataset in Fig. 4.13, which precisely reects the
accuracy of identifying rumor sources in Fig. 4.9.
The strong correlation between the ML values of the real sources and that of
the estimated sources in time-varying social networks reects the eectiveness of our
ML-based method.
Estimation of spreading time
As a byproduct, our ML-based method can also estimate the spreading time (in Eq.
(4.4.1)) of rumors. In order to justify the eectiveness of our proposed method, we
further investigate the eectiveness of this byproduct. We expect the estimate can
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Figure 4.13: The correlation between the maximum likelihood of the real sources and that
of the estimated sources in the Facebook dataset. (A) Sensor observation; (B) Snapshot
observation; (C) Wavefront observation.
accurately expose the real spreading time of rumors. We let the real spreading time
vary from 2 to 6 in four real time-varying social networks. The experiment results
are shown in Table 4.2.
As shown in Table 4.2, we analyze the means and the standard deviations of the
estimated spreading time. We see that the means of the estimated spreading time are
very close to the real spreading time, and most results of the standard deviations are
smaller than 1. Especially when the spreading time T = 2, our ML-based method in
sensor observations and wavefront observations can accurately estimate the spread-
ing time in the MIT reality, Sigcom09 and Enron Email datasets. The results are
also quite accurate in the Facebook dataset. From Table 4.2, we can see that our
method can estimate the spreading time with extremely high accuracy in wavefront
observations, and relatively high accuracy in snapshot observations.
Both the means and standard deviations indicate that our method can estimate
the real spreading time with high accuracy. The accurate estimate of the spreading
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Table 4.2: Accuracy of Estimating Rumor Spreading Time.
Environment settings Estimated spreading time
Observation T MIT Sigcom09 Email Facebook
Sensor
2 20 20 20 1.7870.411
4 4.1450.545 3.9360.384 4.1520.503 3.6900.486
6 6.2290.856 5.9780.488 6.1210.479 5.7200.604
Snapshot
2 1.8770.525 2.2001.212 2.2120.781 2.1700.761
4 3.9180.862 3.9200.723 3.8930.733 4.0500.716
6 6.1831.523 6.1251.330 5.6581.114 5.6501.266
Wavefront
2 20 20 20 1.9770.261
4 4.1170.686 40 3.9840.590 4.0720.652
6 60 5.6801.096 5.9070:640 5.8680.864
time indicates that our method is eective in rumor source identication.
Estimation of infection scale
We further justify the eectiveness of our ML-based method by investigating its
accuracy in estimating the infection scale of rumors provided by the second byproduct
in Eq. (4.4.2). We expect that the ML-based method can accurately estimate the
infection scale of each propagation incident. Particularly, we let the rumor spreading
initiate from the node with largest degree in each full time-varying social network
and spread for 6 time windows in experiments.
In Fig. 4.14, we show the real infection scales at each time tick, and also the
estimated infection scales in dierent types of observations. We can see that the
proposed method can provide a fairly accurate estimate of on the infection scales of
rumors in the MIT reality dataset, the Sigcom09 dataset and the Facebook dataset in
dierent types of observations. As shown in Fig. 4.14(C), the worst result occurred
in the Enron Email dataset after time tick 4. According to our investigation, this was
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Figure 4.14: The accuracy of estimating infection scale in real networks. (A) MIT; (B)
Sigcom09; (C) Enron Email; (D) Facebook.
caused by a great deal of infected nodes that tend to be in the recovered stage in the
SIR scheme, which leads to a fairly large uncertainty in the estimate.
To summarize, all of the above evaluations reect the eectiveness of our method
from dierent aspects: the high correlation between the ML values of the real sources
and that of the estimated sources, the high accuracy in estimating spreading time of
rumors, and the high accuracy of the infection scale.
4.6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this chapter, we explore the problem of rumor source identication in time-varying
social networks that can be reduced to a series of static networks by introducing a
time-integrating window. In order to address the challenges posted by time-varying
social networks, we adopted two innovative methods. First, we utilized a novel reverse
dissemination method which can sharply narrow down the scale of suspicious sources.
This addresses the scalability issue in this research area and therefore dramatically
promotes the eciency of rumor source identication. Then, we introduced an an-
alytical model for rumor spreading in time-varying social networks. Based on this
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model, we calculated the maximum likelihood of each suspect to determine the real
source from the suspects. We conduct a series of experiments to evaluate the ecien-
cy of our method. The experiment results indicate that our methods are ecient in
identifying rumor sources in dierent types of real time-varying social networks.
There is some future work can be done in identifying rumor sources in time-varying
networks. There are also many other models of rumor propagation, such as the mod-
els in [60, 67, 117]. These models can be basically divided into two categories: the
macroscopic models and the microscopic models. The macroscopic models, which are
based on dierential equations, only provide the overall infection trend of rumor prop-
agation, such as the total number of infected nodes [126]. The microscopic models,
which are based on dierence equations, not only provide the overall infection status
of rumor propagation, but they also can estimate the probability of an arbitrary node
being in an arbitrary state [82]. In the eld of identifying propagation sources, re-
searchers generally choose microscopic models, because it requires to estimate which
specic node is the rst one getting infected. As far as we know, so far there is no work
that is based on the macroscopic models to identify rumor sources in social networks.
Future work may also investigate combining microscopic and macroscopic models, or
even adopting the mesoscopic models [61, 64], to estimate both the rumour sources
and the trend of the propagation. There are also many other microscopic models
other than the SIR model adopted in this chapter, such as the SI, SIS, and SIRS
models [82, 120]. As we discussed in Section 4.2.2, people generally will not believe
the rumor again after they know the truth, i.e., after they get recovered, they will not
transit to other states. Thus, the SIR model can reect the state transition of people
when they hear a rumor. We also evaluate the performance of the proposed method
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on the SI model. Since the performance of our method on the SI model is similar to
that on the SIR model, we only present the results on the SIR model in this chapter.
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Chapter 5
Identifying Multiple Rumor
Sources
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we aim at addressing the issue of identifying multiple rumor sources in
complex networks. In the real world, rumors often emerge from multiple sources and
spread incredibly fast in complex networks [29,63,78,103]. After the initial outbreak
of rumor diusion, the following three issues often attract people's attention: (i) How
many sources are there? (ii) Where did the diusion emerge? and (iii) When did the
diusion breakout?
In the past few years, researchers have proposed a series of methods to identify
rumor diusion sources in networks. However, due to the extreme complexity of the
spatiotemporal rumor propagation process and the underlying network structure, few
of existing methods are proposed for identifying multiple diusion sources.
Luo et al. [57] proposed a multi-rumor-center method to identify multiple rumor
sources in tree-structured networks. The computational complexity of this method is
O(nk), where n is the number of infected nodes and k is the number of sources. It
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is too computationally expensive to be applied in large-scale networks with multiple
diusion sources. Chen et al. [14] extended the Jordan-center method from single
source detection to the identication of multiple sources in tree networks. However,
the topologies of real-world networks are far more complex than trees. Fioriti et al.
[25] introduced a dynamic age method to identify multiple diusion sources in general
networks. They claimed that the `oldest' nodes, which were associated to those with
largest eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix, were the sources of the diusion. Similar
work to this technique can be found in [84]. However, an essential prerequisite is that
we need to know the number of sources in advance.
In this chapter, we propose a novel method,K-center method , to identify multi-
ple rumor sources in general networks. In the real world, the rumor diusion processes
in networks are spatiotemporally complex because of the combined multi-scale na-
ture and intrinsic heterogeneity of the networks. To have a clear understanding of the
complex diusion processes, we adopt a measure, eective distance, recently proposed
by Brockmann and Helbing [12]. The concept of eective distance reects the idea
that a small propagation probability between neighboring nodes is eectively equiv-
alent to a large distance between them, and vice versa. By using eective distance,
the complex spatiotemporal diusion processes can be reduced to homogeneous wave
propagation patterns [12]. Moreover, the relative arrival time of diusion arriving at
a node is independent of diusion parameters but linear with the eective distance
between the source and the node of interest. For multi-source diusion, we obtain the
same linear correlation between the relative arrival time and the eective distance of
any infected node. Thereby, supposing that any node can be infected very quickly, an
arbitrary node is more likely to be infected by its closest source in terms of eective
90
distance. Therefore, to identify multiple diusion sources, we need to partition the
infection graph so as to minimize the sum of eective distances between any infected
node and the corresponding partition center. The nal partition centers are viewed
as diusion sources.
The contribution of this part of work is three-fold corresponding to the three key
issues of rumor source identication problem:
 We propose a fast method to identify multiple rumor diusion sources. Based
on this method, we can determine where the diusion emerged. We prove
that the proposed method is convergent and the computational complexity is
O(mnlog), where  = (m;n) is the slowly growing inverse-Ackermann func-
tion, n is the number of infected nodes, andm is the number of edges connecting
them.
 According to the topological positions of the detected rumor sources, we derive
an ecient algorithm to estimate the spreading time of the diusion.
 When the number of sources is unknown, we develop an intuitive and eective
approach that can estimate the number of diusion sources with high accuracy.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Preliminary knowledge is in-
troduced in Section 5.2. The problem formulation of multi-source identication is
presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the K-center method for identifying
multiple rumor diusion sources, followed by Section 5.5 which evaluates the pro-
posed methods in real network topologies. Section 5.6 concludes some remarks in
this chapter.
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Sus. Inf.v(i,t)1v(i,t)
1
Figure 5.1: The state transition graph of a node in the SI model.
5.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce preliminary knowledge used in this chapter, including
the analytic epidemic model [127] and the concept of eective distance [12]. For
convenience, we borrow notions from the area of epidemics to represent the states of
nodes in a network [110]. A node being infected stands for a person getting infected
by a disease, viruses having compromised a computer, or a user believing a rumor.
Readers can derive analogous meanings for a node being susceptible or recovered.
5.2.1 The Epidemic Model
We adopt the classic susceptible-infected (SI ) model to present the diusion dynamics
of each node. Fig. 5.1 shows the state transition graph of a node in this model.
As shown in Fig. 5.1, every node is initially susceptible (Sus.). An arbitrary
susceptible node i can be infected (Inf.) by its already-infected neighbors with prob-
ability v(i; t) at time t. Therefore, we can compute the probability of node i to be
susceptible at time t as in
PS(i; t) = [1  v(i; t)]  PS(i; t  1): (5.2.1)
Then, we can obtain the probability of node i to be infected at time t as in
PI(i; t) = v(i; t)  PS(i; t  1) + PI(i; t  1): (5.2.2)
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We use ji to denote the propagation probability from node j to its neighboring node
i. Then, we can calculate the probability of node i being infected by its neighbors as
in
v(i; t) = 1  j2Ni [1  ji  PI(j; t  1)]; (5.2.3)
where Ni denotes the set of neighbors of node i. This model analytically derives
the probability of each node in various states at an arbitrary time. To address real
problems, the length of each time tick relies on the real environment. It can be one
minute, one hour or one day. We also need to set the propagation probability ij
between nodes properly.
5.2.2 The Eective Distance
Brockmann and Helbing [12] recently proposed a new measure, eective distance,
which can disclose the hidden pattern geometry of complex diusion. The eective
distance from a node i to a neighboring node j is dened as
e(i; j) = 1  logij; (5.2.4)
where ij is again the propagation probability from i to j. This concept reects the
idea that a small propagation probability from i to j is eectively equivalent to a large
distance between them, and vice versa. To illustrate this measure, a simple example
is shown in Fig. 5.2. For instance, the propagation probability is 0.8 between node
S and A, and is only 0.1 between S and B (see Fig. 5.2(A)). Correspondingly, the
eective distance between S and A is 1.22 which is much less than that between S
and B (see Fig. 5.2(B)).
Based on the eective distances between neighboring nodes, the length ( ) of a
path   = fu1; :::; uLg is dened as the sum of eective lengths along the edges of the
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Figure 5.2: An example of altering an infection graph using eective distance. (A) An
example infection graph with source S. The weight on each edge is the propagation prob-
ability. The two dot circles represent the rst-order and second-order neighbors of source
S. The colors indicate the infection order of nodes, e.g., nodes A, C, D and F are infected
after the rst time tick. Notice that the diusion process is spatiotemporally complex. (B)
The altered infection graph. The weight on each edge is the eective distance between the
corresponding end nodes. Notice that the eective distances from source S to the infected
nodes can accurately reect their infection orders.
path. Moreover, the eective distance from an arbitrary node i to another node j is
dened by the length of the shortest path in terms of eective distance from node i
to node j, i.e.,
d(i; j) = min ( ); (5.2.5)
From the perspective of diusion source s, the set of shortest paths in terms of
eective distance to all the other nodes constitutes a shortest path tree 	s. Brock-
mann and Helbing obtain that the diusion process initiated from node s on the
original network can be represented as wave patterns on the shortest path tree 	s.
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In addition, they conclude that the relative arrival time of the diusion arriving at a
node is independent of diusion parameters and is linear with the eective distance
from the source to the node of interest.
In this chapter, we will alter the original network by utilizing eective distance
through converting the propagation probability on each edge to the corresponding
eective distance. Then, by using the linear relationship between the relative arrival
time and the eective distance of any infected node, we derive a novel method to
identify multiple diusion sources.
5.3 Problem Formulation
Before we present the problem formulation derived in this chapter, we rstly show an
alternate expression of an arbitrary infection graph by using eective distance (see
again Fig. 5.2). Fig. 5.2(A) shows an example of an infection graph with diusion
source S. The colors indicate the infection order of nodes (e.g., nodes A, C, D
and F were infected after the rst time tick T = 1, similarly for the other nodes).
Notice that the diusion process is spatiotemporally complex, because the rst-order
neighbors of source S can be infected after the second time tick (e.g., node E) or
even the third time tick (e.g., node B), similarly for the second-order and third-order
neighbors. We then alter the infection graph by replacing the weight on each edge
with the eective distance between the corresponding end nodes (see Fig. 5.2(B)).
We notice that the eective distances from source S to all the infected nodes can
accurately reect the infection order of them. This exactly shows that the relative
arrival time of an arbitrary node getting infected is linear with the eective distance
between the source and the node of interest.
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Suppose that at time T = 0, there are k( 1) sources, S = fs1; :::; skg, starting
the diusion simultaneously [25, 58]. Several time ticks after the diusion started,
we got n infected nodes. These nodes form a connected infection graph Gn, and
each source si has its infection region Ci( Gn). Let C = [ki=1 Ci be a partition
of the infection graph such that Ci \ Cj = ;. for i 6= j. Each partition Ci is a
connected subgraph in Gn and consists of the nodes whose infection can be traced
back to the source node si. For an arbitrary infected node vj 2 Ci, suppose it can
be infected in the shortest time, then according to our previous analysis, it will have
shorter eective distance to source si than to any other source. Therefore, we need
to divide the infection graph Gn into k partitions so that each infected node belongs
to the partition with the shortest eective distance to the partition center. The nal
partition centers are considered as the diusion sources.
Given an infection graph Gn, from the above analysis, we know that our goal is
to identify a set of diusion sources S and the corresponding partition C of the
infection graph Gn. To be precise, we aim to nd a partition C of Gn, to minimize
the following objective function,
minCf =
kX
i=1
X
vj2Ci
d(vj; si); (5.3.1)
where node vj belongs to partition Ci associated with source si, and d(vj; si) is the
shortest-path distance in terms of eective distance between vj and si.
Eq. (5.3.1) is the proposed formulation for multi-source identication problem.
Since, we need to nd out the k centers of the diusion from Eq. (5.3.1), we name the
proposed method of solving the multi-source identication problem as the K-center
method, which we will detail in the following section.
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5.4 The K-center Method
In this section, we propose a K-center method to identify multiple diusion sources
and the corresponding infection regions in general networks. We rstly introduce a
method for network partition. Then, we derive the K-center method. Secondly, ac-
cording to the estimated sources, we derive an algorithm to predict the spreading time
of the diusion. Finally, we present a heuristic algorithm to estimate the diusion
sources when the number of sources is unknown.
5.4.1 Network Partitioning with Multiple Sources
Given an infection network Gn and a set of sources S
 = fs1; :::; skg, network partition
refers to the division of a network into k partitions with si(i 2 f1; 2; :::; kg) as the
partition centers. According to our previous analysis in Section 5.3, an arbitrary node
vj 2 Gn should be classied into partition Ci associated with source si, such that
d(vj; si) = minsl2Sd(vj; sl): (5.4.1)
In essence, for an arbitrary node vj 2 Gn, it needs to be associated to source si that is
the nearest source to vj. This is similar to the Capacity Constrained Network-Voronoi
Diagram (CCNVD) problem [115]. Given a graph and a set of service centers, the
CCNVD partitions the graph into a set of contiguous service areas that meet service
center capacities and minimize the sum of the distances (min-sum) from graph nodes
to allotted service centers. The CCNVD problem is important for critical societal
applications such as assigning evacuees to shelters and assigning patients to hospitals.
In this chapter, to satisfy Eq. (5.4.1), we utilize the Voronoi strategy to partition
the altered infection graph obtained from Section 5.3. The detailed Voronoi partition
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Algorithm 3: Network partition
Input: A set of partition centers S = fsiji = 1; :::; kg in an infection graph Gn.
Initialize: Initialize k partitions: C1 = fs1g, ...,Ck = fskg.
for (j starts from 1 to n) do
Find the nearest source to node vj as follows,
si = argminsl2Sd(xj ; sl): (5.4.2)
Put node vj into partition Ci.
Output: A partition of Gn: C = [ki=1Ci.
process is shown inAlgorithm 1. Future work may use community structure for net-
work partition. Current methods for detecting community structure include strategies
based on betweenness [32], information theory [88], and modularity optimization [68].
5.4.2 Identifying Diusion Sources and Regions
In this subsection, we present the K-center method to identify multiple diusion
sources. According to the objective function in Eq. (5.3.1), we need to nd a partition
C of the altered infection graph Gn, which can minimize the sum of the eective
distances between each infected node and its corresponding partition center. From
the previous subsection, if we randomly choose a set of sources S, Voronoi partition
can split the network into subnets such that each node is associated with its nearest
source. Thus, Voronoi partition can nd a local optimal partition of Gn with a
xed set of sources S. However, to optimize the partition C, we need to adjust the
center of each partition so as to minimize the objective function in Eq. (5.3.1). In
this chapter, we adjust the center of each partition by choosing a new center as the
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Algorithm 4: K-center to identify multiple sources
Input: An infection graph Gn and the number of sources k.
Initialize: Initialize an positive integer L, and randomly choose a set of sources
S(0) = fs(0)1 ; :::; s(0)k g  Gn.
for (l starts from 1 to a given maximum value L) do
Use Algorithm 1 to partition Gn with partition centers S
(0), and obtain a partition:
C(l) = [ki=1C(l)i : (5.4.3)
Find the new center in each partition C
(l)
i as follows,
s
(l)
i = argminvj2C(l)i
X
vx2C(l)i
d(vj ; vx); i = 1; :::; k: (5.4.4)
if (S(l) = fs(l)1 ; :::; s(l)k g is the same as S(l 1)) then
Stop.
Output: A set of estimated sources S(l) = fs(l)1 ; :::; s(l)k g.
node that has the minimum sum of eective distances to all the other nodes in the
partition. Therefore, we call this method as the K-center method. This is similar to
the rumor-center method and the Jordan-center method that consider rumor centers
or Jordan centers as the diusion sources. As the name suggests, the K-center method
is more specic to the multi-source identication. The detailed process of the K-center
method is shown in Algorithm 2.
The following two theorems show the convergence of the proposed K-center method
and its computational complexity.
Theorem 1. The objective function in Eq. (5.3.1) is monotonically decreasing in
iterations. Therefore, the K-center method is convergent.
Proof. Suppose that at iteration t, St = fst1; :::; stkg are the estimated sources.
We then use Algorithm 1 to partition the infection graph Gn as Ct = [ki=1Cki . Thus,
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the objective function at iteration t becomes
f t =
kX
i=1
X
vj2Cti
d(vj; s
t
i): (5.4.5)
At the next iteration t + 1, according to the K-center method, we recalculate the
center of each partition Cti and obtain S
t+1 = fst+11 ; :::; st+1k g, such thatX
vj2Cti
d(vj; s
t+1
i ) 
X
vj2Cti
d(vj; s
t
i): (5.4.6)
Then, the objective function becomes
~f t =
kX
i=1
X
vj2Cti
d(vj; s
t+1
i ): (5.4.7)
From Eqs. (5.4.5) and (5.4.6), we notice that
~f t  f t: (5.4.8)
We then repartition the infection graph Gn with centers S
t+1 = fst+11 ; :::; st+1k g such
that each infected node vj 2 Gn will be associated to a nearest center st+1i , and obtain
a new partition Ct+1 = [ki=1Ct+1i of Gn. Thus, the objective function at iteration t+1
becomes
f t+1 =
kX
i=1
X
vj2Ct+1i
d(vj; s
t+1
i ): (5.4.9)
Since each node is classied to the nearest st+1i , we see that
f t+1  ~f t: (5.4.10)
From Eqs. (5.4.8) and (5.4.10), we have
f t+1  ~f t  f t: (5.4.11)
Therefore, the objective function in Eq. (5.3.1) is monotonically decreasing, i.e., the
K-center method is convergent.
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Algorithm 5: K-center identication with unknown number of sources
Input: An infection graph Gn.
Initialize: Initialize the number of sources k = 1, and set T (0) = 0.
while (1) do
Use Algorithm 2 to identify a set of k sources in Gn: S
(k) = fs1; :::; skg.
Calculate the spreading time T (k) in Eq. (5.4.13).
if (T (k) = T (k 1)) then
Stop.
Update k = k + 1.
Output: A set of k estimated sources S(k) = fs1; :::; skg.
Theorem 2. Given a infection graph Gn with n nodes and m edges, the computational
complexity of the K-center method is O(mnlog), where  = (m;n) is the very
slowly growing inverse-Ackermann function [80].
Proof. From Algorithm 2, we know that the main diculty of the K-center
method stems from the calculation of the shortest paths between node pairs in the
altered infection graph Gn. Other computation in this algorithm can be treated
as a constant. In this chapter, we adopt the Pettie-Ramachandran algorithm [80],
to compute all-pairs shortest paths in Gn. The computational complexity of the
algorithm is O(mnlog), where  = (m;n) is the very slowly growing inverse-
Ackermann function [80]. Therefore, we have proved the theorem.
According to Theorem 1, we know that the proposed K-center method is well
dened. We notice that the rationale of the K-center method is similar to that of the
K-means algorithm in the data-mining eld. Similar to the K-means algorithm, there
is no guarantee that a global minimum in the objective function will be reached. From
Theorem 2, We see that the computational complexity of the K-center method is much
less than the method in [58] with O(nk), and much less than the method in [25] with
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O(n3). In addition, the proposed method can be applied in general networks, whereas
the other methods mainly focus on trees. Comparatively, the proposed method is more
ecient and practical in identifying multiple diusion sources in large networks.
5.4.3 Predicting Spreading Time
Given an infection graph Gn, we can obtain a partition C
 = [ki=1Ci of Gn and the
corresponding partition centers S by using the proposed K-center method. According
to the SI model in Section 5.2.1, the spreading time of diusion can be estimated by
the total number of time ticks of the diusion. Then, we can predict the spreading
time based on the hops between the source and the infected nodes in each partition.
For an arbitrary source si associated with partition Ci and an arbitrary node vj 2 Ci,
we introduce h(si; vj) to denote the minimum number of hops between si and vj.
Therefore, the spreading time in each partition can be estimated as in
ti = maxfh(si; vj)jvj 2 Cig; i 2 f1; :::; kg: (5.4.12)
Then, the spreading time of the whole diusion is as in
T = maxftiji = 1; :::; kg: (5.4.13)
The spreading time T based on hops has simplied the modeling process. In the real
world, the spreading time of dierent paths with the same number of hops may vary
from each other. We have solved this temporal problem of the SI model in another
chapter [110]. In this eld, the majority of current modeling is based on spreading
hops [106]. To be consistent with previous work, we adopt the simplied hop-based
SI model to study the source identication problem.
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5.4.4 Unknown Number of Diusion Sources
In most practical applications, the number of diusion sources is unknown. In this
subsection, we present a heuristic algorithm that allows us to estimate the number of
diusion sources.
From Section 5.4.3, we know that if the number of sources k is given, we can
estimate the spreading time T (k) using Eq. (5.4.13). To estimate the number of
diusion sources, we let k start from 1 and compute the spreading time T (1). Then, we
increase the number of sources k by 1 in each iteration and compute the corresponding
spreading time T (k) until we nd T (k) = T (k+1), i.e., the spreading time of the diusion
stays the same when the number of sources increases from k to k + 1. That is to say
when the number of sources increases from k to k + 1, they can lead to the same
infection graph Gn. We then choose the number of diusion sources as k (or k + 1).
The detailed process of the K-center method with unknown number of sources is
shown in Algorithm 3. We evaluate this heuristic algorithm in Section 5.5.2.
To address real problems, we rstly need to get the underlying network over which
the real diusion spreads. Secondly, we need to measure the propagation probability
on each edge in the network. Thirdly, according to the SI model in Section 5.2.1,
we need to specify the length of one time tick of the diusion properly. All of this
information is crucial to source identication. However it requires big eort to obtain.
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Figure 5.3: Degree distribution. (A) Power Grid; (B) Yeast; (C) Facebook
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the proposed K-center method in three real network
topologies: the North American Power Grid [108], the Yeast protein-protein interac-
tion network [39], and the Facebook network [105]. The Facebook network topology
is crawled from December 29th, 2008 to January 3rd, 2009. The basic statistics of
these networks are shown in Table 5.1, and their degree distributions are shown in
Fig. 5.3. We adopt the classic SI model, and suppose all infections are independent
of each other. In simulations, we typically set the propagation probability on each
Table 5.1: Statistics of the Datasets Collected in Experiments.
Dataset Power Grid Yeast Facebook
# nodes 4,941 2,361 45,813
# edges 13,188 13,554 370,532
Average degree 2.67 5.74 8.09
Maximum degree 19 64 223
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Figure 5.4: The monotonically decreasing of the objective functions.
edge, ij, uniformly distributed in (0, 1). As previous work [110, 127] has proven
that the distribution of propagation probability will not aect the accuracy of the SI
model, uniform distribution is enough to evaluate the performance of the proposed
method. Similar propagation probability setting can be found in [59, 122] and [14].
We randomly choose a set of sources S, and let the number of diusion sources jSj
range from 2 to 5. For each type of network and each number of diusion sources,
we perform 100 runs. The number of 100 comes from the discussion in the previous
work of [127]. The implementation is in C++ and Matlab 2012b.
We rstly show the convergence of the proposed method. Fig. 5.4 shows the
objective function values in iterations when the number of sources is 2 in the three
real network topologies. It can be seen that the objective function is monotonically
decreasing in iterations. Similar results can be found when we choose dierent number
of sources. This, therefore, justies Theorem 1 in Section 5.4.2.
105
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Average error distance (∆)
(A)
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 (
%
)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Average error distance (∆)
(B)
Kcenter
DynamicAge
SuperNode
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Average error distance (∆)
(C)
Power Grid (|S*| = 2) Yeast (|S*| = 2) Facebook (|S*| = 2)
∆ ∆ ∆
Figure 5.5: Histogram of the average error distances () in various networks when S =
2. (A) Power Grid; (B) Yeast; (C) Facebook.
5.5.1 Accuracy of Identifying Rumor Sources
We compare the performance of the proposed K-center method with two competing
methods: the dynamic age method [25] (see Section 3.2.5) and the multi-rumor-center
(also called SuperNode) method [58] (see Section 3.2.3). To quantify the performance
of each method, we rstly match the estimated sources S^ = fs^1; :::; s^kg with the real
sources S = fs1; :::; skg so that the sum of the error distances between each estimated
source and its match is minimized [58, 95]. The average error distance is then given
by
 =
1
jSj
jSjX
i=1
h(si; s^i): (5.5.1)
We expect that our method can accurately capture the real sources or at least a set
of sources very close to the real sources (i.e.,  is as small as possible).
The average error distances for the three real network topologies are provided in
Table 5.2. From this table we can see that the proposed method outperforms the
other two methods, that the estimated sources are closer to the real sources. To
have a clearer comparison between our proposed method and the other two methods,
106
∆ ∆ ∆
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Average error distance (∆)
(A)
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 (
%
)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Average error distance (∆)
(B)
Kcenter
DynamicAge
SuperNode
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Average error distance (∆)
(C)
Power Grid (|S*| = 3) Yeast (|S
*| = 3) Facebook (|S
*| = 3)
Figure 5.6: Histogram of the average error distances () in various networks when S =
3. (A) Power Grid; (B) Yeast; (C) Facebook.
we show the histogram of the average error distances () in Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 5.6,
when jSj = 2 or 3, respectively. We can see that the proposed K-center method
outperforms the others. When jSj = 2, the estimated sources are very close to
Table 5.2: Accuracy of Multi-source Identication.
Experiment settings Average error distance 
Infection Percentage %
Network jSj MRC Dynamic age K-center
Power Grid
2 3.135 3.610 1.750 96.290
3 4.246 4.726 2.670 83.237
4 5.331 6.027 3.240 78.322
5 6.388 7.117 3.418 72.903
Yeast
2 2.700 3.175 2.680 89.606
3 3.520 3.146 2.733 74.762
4 3.525 3.077 2.962 70.599
5 3.474 3.050 2.874 68.563
Facebook
2 3.433 3.950 3.215 81.776
3 4.667 4.763 4.073 76.654
4 5.120 5.762 4.137 69.762
5 5.832 6.701 4.290 63.723
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the real sources in the Power Grid, with the average error distances are generally 1-2
hops. However, the average error distances are around 3-4 hops when using the multi-
rumor-center method, and around 3-5 hops when using the dynamic age method. For
the Yeast network, the diusion sources estimated by the proposed method are with
an average of 2-3 hops away from the real sources. However, the sources estimated
by using the multi-rumor-center method are averagely 2-4 hops away from the real
sources, and averagely 3-4 hops away when using the dynamic age method. For the
Facebook network, the proposed method can estimate the diusion sources with an
average of 2-3 hops away from the real sources. However, the estimated sources are
averagely 3-4 hops away from the real sources when using the other two methods.
Similarly, when jSj = 3, the diusion sources estimated by the proposed method are
much closer to the real sources in these real networks.
We have compared the performance of our method with two competeting methods.
From the experiment results (Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 5.6, and Table 5.2), we see that our
proposed method is superior to previous work. Around 80% of all experiment runs
identify the nodes averagely 2-3 hops away from the real sources when there are two
diusion sources. Moreover, when there are three diusion sources, there are also
Table 5.3: Accuracy of Spreading Time Estimation.
Experiment settings Estimated spreading time
Network jSj T = 4 T = 5 T = 6
Power Grid
2 4.020  0.910 5.050  1.256 5.627  1.212
3 4.085  0.805 5.051  0.934 6.006  1.123
Yeast
2 4.600  0.710 5.130  0.469 5.494  0.578
3 4.534  0.427 5.050  0.408 5.447  0.396
Facebook
2 4.380  1.170 5.246  0.517 5.853  0.645
3 4.417  0.736 5.378  0.645 5.738  0.467
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Figure 5.7: Estimate of the number of sources. (A) Yeast; (B) Power Grid; (C) Facebook.
around 80% of all experiment runs identifying the nodes averagely 3 hops away from
the real sources.
5.5.2 Estimation of Source Number and Spreading Time
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the proposed method in estimating
the number of sources and predicting diusion spreading time.
Table 5.3 shows the means and the standard deviations of the time estimation in
the three real networks when we vary the real spreading time T from 4 to 6 and the
number of sources jSj from 2 to 3. Notice that the means of the estimated time are
very close to the real spreading time under dierent experiment settings, and most
results of the standard deviations are smaller than 1. This indicates that our method
can estimate the real spreading time with high accuracy.
Fig. 5.7 shows the results in estimating the number of diusion sources in dierent
networks. We let the number of sources, jSj, range from 1 to 3. In Fig. 5.7,
the horizontal axis indicates the estimated number of sources and the vertical axis
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that of the real sources when S = 2. (A) Power Grid; (B) Yeast; (C) Facebook.
indicates the percentage of experiment runs estimating the corresponding the number
sources. For the Yeast network, we see that 70% experiment runs can accurately
estimate the number of sources when jSj = 1. More than 80% of experiment runs
can accurately estimate the number of sources when jSj = 2, and around 60% when
jSj = 3. For the Power Grid network, it can be seen that around 50% of the total
experiment runs can accurately detect the number of sources when jSj ranges from
1 to 3. The accuracy is about 68% on Facebook when jSj ranges from 1 to 3.
The high accuracy in estimating both the spreading time and the number of
diusion sources reects the eciency of our method from dierent angles.
5.5.3 Eectiveness Justication
We justify the eectiveness of the proposed K-center method from two dierent as-
pects. Firstly, we examine the correlation between the objective function values in Eq.
(5.3.1) of the estimated sources and those of the real sources. If they are highly cor-
related with each other, the objective function in Eq. (5.3.1) will accurately describe
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Figure 5.9: The correlation between the objective function of the estimated sources and
that of the real sources when S = 3. (A) Power Grid; (B) Yeast; (C) Facebook.
the multi-source identication problem. Secondly, at each time tick, we examine the
average eective distances from the newly infected nodes to their corresponding dif-
fusion sources. The linear correlation between the average eective distances and the
spreading time will justify the eectiveness of using eective distance in estimating
multiple diusion sources.
Correlation Between Real Sources and Estimated Sources
We investigate the correlation between the estimated sources and the real sources
by examining the correlation of their objective function values in Eq. (5.3.1). If the
estimated sources are exactly the real sources, their objective function values f should
present high correlations.
Fig. 5.8 and Fig. 5.9 show the correlation results of the objective function values
when jSj is 2 or 3, respectively. We can see that their objective function values
approximately form linear relationships. This means that the real sources and the
estimated sources are highly correlated with each other. The worst results occur in
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Figure 5.10: The eective distances between the nodes infected at each time tick and their
corresponding sources when S = 2. (A) Power Grid; (B) Yeast; (C) Facebook.
Fig. 5.8(A) and Fig. 5.9(A) in the Power Grid network. However, the majority of the
correlation results in these two gures still tend to be clustered in a line. The strong
correlation between the real sources and estimated sources reects the eectiveness
of the proposed method.
Average Eective Distance at Each Time Tick
We further investigate the correlation between the relative arrival time of nodes get-
ting infected and the average eective distance from them to their corresponding
sources. The experiment results in dierent networks when jSj is 2 or 3 are shown
in Fig. 5.10 and Fig. 5.11, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 5.10 and Fig. 5.11, at each time tick, the eective distance
from the nodes infected at this time tick to their corresponding sources are indicated
as blue circles. Their average eective distance to the corresponding sources at each
time tick is indicated as red square. It can be seen that the average eective distance
112
1 2 3 4 5
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Time tick
(C)
1 2 3 4 5
0
2
4
6
8
10
Time tick
(B)
1 2 3 4 5
0
2
4
6
8
E
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
 d
is
ta
n
c
e
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 s
o
u
rc
e
s
 a
n
d
 
th
e
 n
o
d
e
s
 i
n
fe
c
te
d
 a
t 
e
a
c
h
 t
im
e
 t
ic
k
Time tick
(A)
Power Grid (|S
*
|=3) Yeast  (|S
*
|=3) Facebook  (|S
*
|=3)
Figure 5.11: The eective distances between the nodes infected at each time tick and their
corresponding sources when S = 3. (A) Power Grid; (B) Yeast; (C) Facebook.
is linear with the relative arrival time. This therefore justies that the proposed
K-center method is well-developed.
5.6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this chapter, we studied the problem of identifying multiple rumor sources in
complex networks. Few of current techniques can detect multiple sources in complex
networks. We used eective distance to transform the original network in order to
have a clear understanding of the complex diusion pattern. Based on the altered
network, we derive a succinct formulation for the problem of identifying multiple
rumor sources. Then we proposed a novel method that can detect the positions of
the multiple rumor sources, estimate the number of sources, and predict the spreading
time of the diusion. Experiment results in various real network topologies show the
outperformance of the proposed method than other competing methods, which justify
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the eectiveness and eciency of our method.
The identication of multiple rumor sources is a signicant but dicult task. In
this chapter, we have adopted the SI model with the knowledge of which nodes are
infected and their connections. There are also some other models, such as the SIS
and SIR. These models may conceal the infection history of the nodes that have
been recovered. Therefore, the proposed method requiring a complete observation of
network will not work in the SIS or SIR model. According to our study, we may need
other techniques, e.g., the network completion, to cope with the SIS and SIR models.
Future research includes the use of dierent models. Moreover, in the real world, we
may only obtain partial observations of a network. Thus, future work includes multi-
source identication with partial observations. We may also need to take community
structures into account to more accurately identify multiple diusion sources.
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Chapter 6
Identifying Rumor Sources in
Large-scale Networks
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we develop a community structure based approach to eciently i-
dentify diusion sources in large-scale networks. With rapid urbanization progress
worldwide, the world is becoming increasingly interconnected. This brings us great
convenience in daily communication but also enables rumors to diuse all around the
world. The huge scale of the underlying networks and the complex spatiotemporal
rumor diusions make it dicult to develop eective strategies to quickly and accu-
rately identify rumor sources and therefore eliminate the socio-economic impact of
dangerous rumors.
In the past few years, researchers have proposed a series of methods to identify
diusion sources in networks. However, those methods are either with high compu-
tational complexity or with relative lower complexity but for particularly structured
networks (e.g., trees and regular networks). For example, the initial methods of ru-
mor source identication are designed for tree networks, including the rumor center
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method [96] and the Jordan center method [120]. Later, the constraints on trees
were relaxed but with complete or snapshot observations through heuristic strategies,
including Bayesian inference [5, 82], spectral techniques [25], and centralities meth-
ods [15]. Most of them are based on scanning the whole network. However, real
networks are far more complex than tree networks and it is impractical to scan the
whole network to locate the diusion source, especially for large networks. Recently,
Pinto et al. [82] proposed to identify rumor sources based on sensor observations.
The proposed Gaussian method chooses sensors randomly or set up sensors on high
degree nodes. In fact, the selection of sensors is crucial in identifying rumor sources
since well chosen sensors can reect the spreading direction and speed of the diusion.
Seo et al. [94] compared dierent strategies of choosing sensors, and concluded that
high betweenness or degree sensors are more ecient in identifying rumor sources.
They proposed a Four-metric source estimator which is also based on scanning the
whole network and view the diusion source as the node which not only can reach
the infected sensors with the minimum sum of distances but also is the furthest away
from the non-infected sensors. In a nutshell, current methods are not suitable for
large-scale networks due to the expensive computational complexity and the large
scale of real networks. Readers could refer to [40] for a detailed survey in this area.
In this chapter, we propose a community structure based approach to identify
diusion sources in large-scale networks. It not only addresses the scalability issue in
this area, but also shows signicant advantages. Firstly, to eectively set up sparse
sensors, we detect the community structure of a network and choose the community
bridge nodes as sensors. According to the earliest infected bridge sensors, we can easily
determine the very rst infected community where the diusion started and spread
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out to the rest of the network. Consequently, this narrows the suspicious sources
down to the very rst infected community. Therefore, this overcomes the scalability
issue of current methods. According to a fundamental property of communities that
links inside are much denser than those connecting outside nodes, bridge sensors will
be very sparse. Secondly, to accurately locate the diusion source from the rst
infected community, we use the intrinsic property of the diusion source that the
relative infection time of any node is linear with its eective distance from the source.
The eective distance between any pair of nodes is based on not only the number
of hops but also the propagation probabilities along the paths between them [12].
It reects the idea that a small propagation probability between nodes is eectively
equivalent to a large distance between them, and vice versa. Finally, we use correlation
coecient to measure the degree of linear dependence between the relative infection
time and eective distances for each suspect, and consider the one that has the largest
correlation coecient as the diusion source.
The main contribution of this chapter is three-fold.
 We address the scalability issue in source identication problems. Instead of
randomly choosing sensors or setting up high centrality nodes as sensors in
previous methods, we assign sensors on community bridges. According to the
infection time of bridge sensors, we can easily narrow the suspicious sources
down to the very rst infected community.
 We propose a novel method which can eciently locate diusion sources from
the suspects. Here, we use the intrinsic property of the real diusion source that
the eective distance to any node is linear with the relative infection time of
that node. The eective distance makes full use of the propagation probability
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and the number of hops between node pairs, which dramatically enhances the
eectiveness of our method.
 We evaluate our method in two large networks collected from Twitter. The
experiment results show signicant advantages of our method in identifying
diusion sources in large networks. Especially, when the average size of com-
munities shrinks, the accuracy of our method increases dramatically.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Preliminary knowledge about
community structure is introduced in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents the proposed
community structure based approach. In Section 6.4, we evaluate the proposed ap-
proach in large networks and we compare it to many competeting methods in Section
6.4.4. Section 6.5 concludes some remarks in this chapter.
6.2 Community Structure
In general, communities are groups of nodes sharing common properties or corre-
sponding to functional units within a networked system. Many networks of interest,
including social networks, computer networks, and transportation networks, are found
to divide naturally into communities, where the links inside are much denser than
those connecting this set and the rest of the network [32]. Recent research results
show that community structure can dramatically aect the behavior of dynamical
processes of complex networks [68].
Past work on methods for discovering communities in networks divides into two
principal lines of research, both with long histories. The rst, generally called hard-
partition, assumes that communities of complex networks are disjoint, placing each
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of network communities and community bridges. (A) Separat-
ed communities. Community bridges are the nodes associated with between-community
edges, e.g., nodes A and D connecting the blue community and the green community.
(B) Overlapping communities. Community bridges are not only the nodes associated with
between-community edges but also the nodes shared by dierent communities, e.g., nodes
H, I and J shared by the green community and the yellow community.
node in only one community and all communities are non-overlapped. Algorithms
include division based on betweenness [32], information theory [88], modularity opti-
mization [68], and some others [90]. However, many real networks are characterized
by well-dened statistics of overlapping communities [76]. For example, in col-
laboration networks an author might work with researchers in many groups, and in
biological networks a protein might interact with many groups of proteins. Algorithms
in detecting overlapping communities include techniques based on k-clique [76], link
clustering [2], and some others [75]. Fig. 6.1 shows two examples to illustrate sepa-
rated communities and overlapping communities. To demonstrate the robustness of
the results across dierent types of communities, we will apply both separated and
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overlapping community detection methods on various real networks  InfoMap [89]
and Link Clustering [2].
In this chapter, we will use community structures of networks to eectively as-
sign sensors. More specically, we set sensors on community bridges. Community
bridges are nodes shared by two or more dierent communities or associated with
inter-community links (See Fig. 6.1). This is fundamentally dierent from previ-
ous methods which choose high centrality nodes as sensors or even randomly set up
sensors.
6.3 Community-based Method
In this section, we rst introduce an eective strategy to set up sensors. Then, we
derive an ecient method to detect sources according to sensors' sparse observations.
Finally, we analyze the computational complexity of our method and compare to that
of current methods.
6.3.1 Assigning Sensors
To identify diusion sources under sensor observations, it is very critical to assign
sensors properly. To eectively set up sensors in a network, we need to choose the
nodes that are very important in diusion processes. From Section 6.2, we see that
community bridges play a crucial role in transmitting information from one communi-
ty to another. They can reect the spreading direction and speed of diusion. Thus,
we choose community bridges as sensors.
To assign sensors on community bridges, we rst need to detect the community
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structure of a network. According to Section 6.2, community structures can generally
be divided into two categories: separated communities and overlapping communities.
For separated communities, community bridges are the nodes associating with the
inter-community edges. For example in Fig. 6.1 (A), the green community and red
community are connected by bridges E and F , and the bridges B, H, C andG connect
the blue community and the red community. For overlapping communities, commu-
nity bridges correspond not only to the nodes associated with the inter-community
edges, but also the nodes shared by dierent communities. For example in Fig. 6.1
(B), the green community and the yellow community are connected by shared bridges
H, I and J , and bridges G, C and D connect the green community and the purple
community.
When we assign sensors on community bridges, we need to pay attention to the
number of sensors. The more sensors we set up, the more information we will collect
from them. However, in the real world, setting up more sensors will require more
money to buy equipments and more labor to maintain them. Generally, we can
control the number of bridges by regulating the average size of communities. The
larger the average size of communities, the smaller the number of community bridges,
and vice versa. Here are two extreme examples to explain this. (i) If we divide a
network into two communities, and choose one node as the rst community and all
the remaining nodes in the second community, the number of bridge nodes will be
d + 1, where d is the degree of the node in the rst community. (ii) If we set every
single node as a community, the number of bridges will be the number of nodes in
the whole network. Furthermore, the number of bridges will be very small because
of the intrinsic property of communities that the links between communities is much
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sparser than those within communities. In Section 6.4.2, we will analyze in detail the
inuence of the average size of communities in detecting diusion sources.
Compared with the existing sensor selection methods, which randomly choose
sensors or select high centrality nodes as sensors, the proposed community structure
based sensor selection method can additionally reect the diusion direction and
speed. We will compare dierent sensor-selection methods in various real networks
in Section 6.4.4.
6.3.2 Community Structure Based Approach
The proposed community structure based approach consists of two steps. In the rst
step, we determine the very rst infected communities. Given a diusion process
running for some time in a network, we obtain sparse observations from the sensors
assigned by the scheme in the previous subsection. Assume there are k sensors having
been infected, denoted as O = fo1; :::; okg, and ft1; :::; tkg represents the time at which
the infection arrives at these sensors. Then, according to the rst infected sensor(s),
we can determine which community started the diusion since the diusion has to go
through community bridges to infect other communities. For example in Fig. 6.1 (A),
if sensors fH;F;E;Bg are observed as infected and node H is the rst infected one,
we can determine that the diusion started from the red community. In Fig. 6.1 (B),
if sensors fK;F;H; J;Gg are observed infected and node K is the rst infected one,
we can determine that the diusion could have started from the blue community or
the yellow community. We denote the set of nodes in the rst infected communities
as
U = fu1; u2; :::; umg: (6.3.1)
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Since we do not have an absolute time reference, we have knowledge only about the
relative infection time. Choosing an arbitrary infected sensor, say o1, as the reference
node, we can obtain the relative infection time of all the infected sensors as in
 = f0; t2   t1; :::; tk   t1g: (6.3.2)
In the second step, we investigate each suspect in the set U and identify the real
diusion source. According to the properties of eective distance in , we know that
the relative infection time of any infected node is linear with its eective distance from
the real diusion source. Therefore, to identify the diusion source, we aim to nd the
suspect with the best linear correlation between sensors' relative infection time and
their eective distances from this suspect. Here, we use the correlation coecient,
which is widely used as a measure of the degree of linear dependence between two
variables [50]. The correlation coecient between two vectors x = fx1; x2; :::; xng and
y = fy1; y2; :::; yng is dened as,
e =
Pn
i=1(xi   x)(yi   y)pPn
i=1(xi   x)2
pPn
i=1(yi   y)
; (6.3.3)
where x and y are the means of xi and yi, respectively. The correlation coecient
ranges from -1 to 1. A value of 1 implies that a linear equation describes the rela-
tionship between x and y perfectly, with all data points lying on a line for which y
increases as x increases. A value of -1 implies that all data points lie on a line for
which y decreases as x increases. A value of 0 implies that there is no linear correla-
tion between the variables. Therefore, we need to nd a suspect with the maximum
correlation coecient. More precisely, we aim to nd a suspect in U to maximize
Eq. (6.3.3) in terms of the relative infection time of sensors and their eective dis-
tance from the suspect. The detailed process of the proposed approach is given in
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Algorithm 1.
Compared with current methods of identifying diusion sources, the proposed
approach is superior, as many of the existing methods ignore the propagation proba-
bilities [40]. The proposed method utilizes the eective distance between nodes which
precisely reects not only the propagation probability but also the number of hops
between nodes (See the denition of eective distance in Section 5.2.2). This makes
our algorithm more accurate and eective. The comparison of our method to many
competeting methods is shown in Section 6.4.4.
6.3.3 Computational Complexity
In this subsection, we analyze the computation complexity of the proposed method
and compare it with other existing methods of identifying diusion sources based on
sensor observations, including the Gaussian method [82], the Monte Carlo method [1],
and the Four-metric method [94].
From Algorithm 1, we see that the computation of our method is dominated by
Step 2 of calculating the correlation coecient e for each suspect ui in the very rst
infected community U . More specically, the majority of computation is in the cal-
culation of eective distance between ui and any infected sensor oj (2 fo1; o2; :::; okg).
Here, we use Dijkstra's algorithm [30] to compute the shortest paths (i.e., the ef-
fective distances) to all infected sensors from each ui. Dijkstra's algorithm requires
O(M + N logN) computations to nd the shortest paths from one node to every
other node in a network, where M is the number of edges and N is the num-
ber of nodes in the network. However, in Algorithm 1, we only need to calcu-
late the eective distance between each suspect ui and any infected sensor oj, i.e.,
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[D(ui; o1); D(ui; o2); :::; D(ui; ok)] in Eq. (6.5.1). Therefore, the complexity will be far
less than O(M + N logN). Suppose the average size of communities in the network
is m and the number of infected sensors is k. Then, the computational complexity
of the proposed method is far less than O(L(M + N logN)), where L = minfk;mg.
Thus, if the average community size is smaller, it requires less time to identify the
diusion source.
Current methods are far more complex than the proposed method. They need
to scan the whole network, and calculate the shortest path from each sensor to any
other node. For example, the computational complexity of the Gaussian method [82]
is O(N3) since it requires constructing the BFS tree rooted at each node in a network,
and it also needs to calculate the inverse of the covariance matrix for each BFS tree.
The computational complexity of the Monte Carlo method [1] is O(k(M+N logN)=2),
where k is the number of infected sensors. The majority of the computation is in
calculating the shortest paths from an arbitrary node i to all the sensors in order to
sample the infection time of all sensors assuming that node i is the diusion source.
By the central limit theorem, O(1=2) samples are needed to achieve an error o(). For
the Four-metric method [94], the majority of the computation is also in computing the
lengths of the shortest paths from each node to all the sensors, both infected and non-
infected. Thus, the computational complexity of this method is O(n(M +N logN)),
where n is the number of sensors.
Compared with these existing methods of identifying diusion sources based on
sensor observations, we see that the computational complexity of the proposed method
is much less than that of current methods. Furthermore, the proposed method takes
advantages of the relative infection time of sensors, the propagation probabilities and
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the number of hops between nodes. However, the existing methods either require
the generation of the infection time of each sensor (e.g., the Gaussian and Monte
Carlo methods) or ignore the propagation probabilities (e.g., the Four-metric method)
between nodes. Thus, the proposed method is superior and is able to work in large
networks.
6.4 Evaluation
The proposed community structure based approach is evaluated in two real-world
large networks, the Retweet network and the Mention network collected from Twitter,
which were also used in the work of [111]. These two networks were constructed from
the tweets collected by using the Twitter streaming API during Mar 24 and Apr 25,
2012. The basic statistics of these two networks are listed in Table 6.1. In these two
networks, only reciprocal communications are kept as network edges, as bi-directional
communications reect more stable and reliable social connections. Fig. 6.2 shows
the degree distribution of these two networks. We can see that node degrees of these
two networks follow the power law distribution. The number of contacts (retweets or
mentions) between any two neighbors is set as the weight of the edge between them.
Based on the number of contacts between any two neighbors, we also generate the
Table 6.1: Statistics of Two Large Networks in Experiments.
Dataset Mention Retweet
# nodes 300,197 374,829
# edges 1,048,818 598,487
Average degree 3.49 1.60
Maximum degree 124 178
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Figure 6.2: Degree distribution of the two large networks. (A) The Mention network; (B)
The Retweet network.
propagation probability between them, as in
pij = min

1;
z
2  

; (6.4.1)
where z is the number of contacts between node i and j, and  is the median of
contacts between neighbors.
To demonstrate the robustness of the proposed method across dierent types
of community structure, we apply separated (InfoMap [89]) and overlapping (Link
Clustering [76]) community detection methods on these two networks. The Infomap
method shows communities of a network in a hierarchical structure from which we
can choose dierent levels of communities. In each level, the number of communities
will be dierent. The deeper the level is, the more communities we will obtain and
the smaller the average size of each community will be. In our experiments, we
typically choose the second, third and fourth-level communities, denoted by  = 2,
3 and 4. On the other hand, we can adjust the parameter  in the Link Clustering
method to regulate the number of communities of a network. The larger  is, the
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Figure 6.3: The accuracy of the proposed method in identifying diusion sources in two
real large networks. (A) and (C) show the accuracy of our method in the Mention network
and the Retweet network having overlapping-community structure with parameter  2
f0:10; 0:15; 0:20g. (B) and (D) show the accuracy of our method in these networks having
separated-community structure with parameter  2 f2; 3; 4g.
more communities we obtain, and similar to the previous method, the smaller the
average size of the communities will be. We typically set  = 0.10, 0.15 and 0.20 in
our experiments. In each experiment, we randomly choose a diusion source in each
run over 100 runs. The number of 100 comes from the discussion in the previous work
of [126]. The implementation is in conducted in C++.
6.4.1 Identifying Diusion Sources in Large Networks
We show the accuracy of the proposed method in identifying diusion sources in this
subsection. We use  to denote the error distance (i.e., the number of hops) between
a real diusion source and an estimated source. Ideally, we have  = 0 if our method
accurately captures the real source. In practice, we expect that our method can
accurately capture the real source or a node very close to the real source.
Fig. 6.3 shows the accuracy of our method in the Mention network and the Retweet
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network associated with overlapping-community structure and separated-community
structure. Overall, we see that the proposed method performs very well in these
two large networks with the majority of the experiments able to precisely identify the
diusion sources. Especially with a large  or , the proposed method performs better
in identifying diusion sources, as the number of communities becomes larger, and
the average size of communities becomes smaller. Fig. 6.3 (A) shows the experiment
results in the Mention network with overlapping-community structure. When  is
0.10, around 48% of the experiment runs can accurately identify the diusion sources.
When  increases to 0.15 (equivalently, the average size of communities becomes
small), the accuracy of our method increases to about 57%. When  increases to
0.20, more than 83% of the experiment runs can accurately identify the real sources.
Fig. 6.3 (B) shows the experiment results in the Mention network with separated-
community structure. Similar to the results in the overlapping-community structure,
when  is 2, around 52% of the experiment runs can precisely identify the real diusion
sources. When  increases to 3 (i.e., the average size of communities becomes small),
the accuracy of our method increases to around 70%. When  increases to 4, our
method achieves an accuracy of around 98%, which means only a few runs could not
identify the real sources. Similar results can be found in the Retweet network in Fig.
6.3(C) and Fig. 6.3(D).
Furthermore, we notice that the average distance between the estimated sources
and the real sources is very small. For both networks, from Fig. 6.3 we see that the
average error distance is within 1-2 hops. That is to say, even when the proposed
method does not accurately identify the real source, it is on average within a radius
of 1-2 hops from the estimated source. In addition, from Fig. 6.3 we see that the
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maximum error distance is also very small (on average 5 hops). Compared with the
existing methods, which have low accuracy and expensive computational complex-
ity [40], the proposed method shows signicantly higher performance in identifying
diusion sources in large networks.
To summarize, our method performs very well in large networks associated with
either overlapping or separated community structures. Especially, when a network is
associated with a small average community size, our method can accurately identify
diusion sources.
6.4.2 Inuence of the Average Community Size
From the previous subsection, we notice that the accuracy of the proposed method
increases when the parameter  or  becomes large. Equivalently, the performance of
the proposed method improves when the average size of communities becomes small.
In order to analyze the inuence of the average size of communities in the accuracy
of our method, we investigate the number of communities, bridges and suspects when
we change the parameters in the separated-community and overlapping-community
detection methods. More specically, we let the parameter  range from 2 to 4 for
the Infomap method of detecting separated community structure, and we let the
parameter  range from 0.10 to 0.20 for the Link Clustering method of detecting
overlapping community structure.
The distribution of the community sizes of the previous two networks under dier-
ent parameter settings is shown in Fig. 6.4. Overall, we can see that the community
size shows power law distribution, i.e., a few communities are of a signicantly larger
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Figure 6.4: Community size distribution under dierent parameter setting. (A) and (B)
show the community size distribution in the Mention network and the Retweet network
having separated community structure with  2 f2; 3; 4g; (C) and (D) show the commu-
nity size distribution in the Mention network and the Retweet network having separated
community structure with  2 f0:10; 0:15; 0:20g.
size but the majority of the communities are of a smaller size. Furthermore, the num-
ber of communities decreases when the parameter  or  becomes smaller (compare
the density of blue and green dots in Fig. 6.4). The detailed statistics of the com-
munity structures of these two networks derived by setting dierent parameters are
shown in Table 6.2. For the Retweet network, when  = 2, there are 852 communi-
ties, 8,422 bridge nodes, an average of 2,158 suspects, and the average error distance
between the estimated sources and the real sources is 1.77. When  increases to 3,
the average error distance decreases to 1.36 and the number of suspects shrinks to
925, while the number of communities and bridges increases. When  increase to 4,
the average error distance decreases to 0.48 and the number of suspects shrinks to
153, while the number of communities bridges becomes larger. We notice that when
the parameter  becomes large, the number of communities rises, which leads to a
decrease in the average size of communities. Consequently, more bridges are needed
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Figure 6.5: The inuence of the ratio of infected sensors in the accuracy of our method in
the two real networks.
to connect communities. We then can obtain more information from bridge sensors.
Thus, we see that the average error distance between the real sources and the esti-
mated sources becomes smaller. Similar results can be found in both networks with
overlapping-community structure. When the parameter  increases, the number of
bridges increases, and therefore, the average error distance decreases.
Table 6.2: Statistics of Network Communities and Accuracy of Our Method.
Experiment settings
Infomap Link clustering
 = 2  = 3  = 4  = 0.10  = 0.15  = 0.20
Retweet
# communities 852 2,684 21,300 2,332 7,166 34,559
# bridges 8,422 13,078 36,558 7,470 12,281 76,537
# suspects 2,158 925 153 5,256 1,380 157
Error distance 1.77 1.36 0.48 1.83 1.18 0.96
Mention
# communities 588 5,001 32,355 2,754 7,812 21,187
# bridges 10,165 18,974 57,335 8,306 14,072 81,287
# suspects 3,525 1,169 318 6,132 1,247 297
Error distance 1.37 0.81 0.50 1.26 0.69 0.58
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In the real world, it requires a lot of money and energy to set up sensors and main-
tain them. Hence, we need to choose as few sensors as possible and start to identify
diusion sources when partial sensors get infected. Here, we select a moderate-size
set of sensors and then analyze the accuracy of our method when only a small ratio
of sensors are infected (see Fig. 6.5). More specically, we choose  = 2 for the
Infomap method and  = 0:10 for the Link Clustering method. Fig. 6.5 shows the
average error distance between the real sources and the estimated sources when the
ratio of infected sensors ranges from 10% to 100%. We see that when more than 30%
of sensors are infected, our method can identify a node on average less than 2 hops
away from the real source. When there are more than 50% of sensors are infected,
the average error distance between the real source and the estimated source is ap-
proximately 1. Therefore, the proposed method can identify diusion sources with
high accuracy even if only a small ratio of sensors are infected.
From Figs. 6.4, 6.5 and Table 6.2, we see that the performance of the proposed
method improves when the average community size becomes smaller. Even if the
average community size is large and only a small ratio of sensors are infected, our
method can still accurately identify the real diusion source or a node very close to
the real diusion source.
6.4.3 Eectiveness Justication
In the second step of the proposed method, we utilize the linear correlation between
the relative infection time of any sensor and its eective distance from the diusion
source. The suspect with the highest correlation coecient is considered as the diu-
sion source. In order to justify the eectiveness of the proposed method, we examine
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Figure 6.6: Justication of our method on the Mention network. (A) Linear correlation
between the relative infection time of sensors and their average eective distance from the
diusion source. Specically, we let the diusion start from sources with dierent degrees:
small degree, moderate degree and large degree. (B), (C) and (D) show the correlation
coecient value for each suspect.
the relationship between the relative infection time of any infected node and its ef-
fective distance from the diusion source, especially when the diusion starts from
sources of dierent degrees.
In the previous two networks, we let the diusion start from a small, moderate
and large degree source respectively, and compare the correlation coecient of the
real source and that of all the suspects. Fig. 6.6 shows the experiment results on the
Mention network. From Fig. 6.6 (A), we can see that, with the diusion starting from
sources of dierent degrees, the relative infection time of infected nodes is linear with
their average eective distance from the diusion source. We notice that when the
diusion starts from a large degree source, the scatter plot begins to curve beginning
at time tick 15. According to our investigation, almost all of the nodes have been
infected by time tick 15. Then, in the remaining time, only the nodes which refused
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Figure 6.7: Justication of our method on the Retweet network. (A) Linear correlation
between the relative infection time of sensors and their average eective distance from the
diusion source. (B), (C) and (D) show the correlation coecient value for each suspect.
to be infected before time tick 15 can get infected. However, their smallest number
of hops from the diusion source is xed. Therefore, according to Eq. (5.2.5), its
eective distance from the diusion source will be relatively short. In Fig. 6.6 (B),
(C) and (D), we show the correlation coecient of all suspects. It can be seen that
the real sources (see the red dots) have a high correlation coecient whenever the
diusion starts from a source of small, moderate, or large degree. Fig. 6.7 shows the
experiment results on the Retweet network. Similar to the results on the Mention
network, the relative infection time of any infected node is linear to its eective
distance from the diusion sources of dierent degrees. When the diusion starts
from a large degree source, their relation starts to curve towards the end. This is
because almost all of the nodes have been infected by time tick 13. Fig. 6.7 (B),
(C) and (D) show the correlation coecient of all suspects. We can see that the real
sources all have high correlation coecient.
In summary, the linear correlation between relative infection time of nodes and
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their average eective distance from diusion source justies the eectiveness of our
proposed method.
6.4.4 Comparison with Current Methods
In this section, we compare the proposed community structure based approach with
three competeting methods of identifying diusion sources in networks based on sensor
observations. They include:
 The Gaussian method [82],
 The Monte Carlo method [1], and
 The Four-metric method [94].
Readers can refer to Section 3.2 for more details. However, according to Section 6.1,
these methods are all susceptible to the scalability issue because they need to scan
every node in a network, which leads to very high computational complexity (see Sec-
tion 6.3.3). Especially, for the Gaussian method, which is designed for tree networks,
it needs to construct the BFS trees rooted at each node in a general network and the
inverse of the covariance matrix for each BFS tree. Therefore, these methods are too
computationally expensive to be applied in large networks. In addition, among these
methods only the Four-metric method investigated and compared dierent sensor s-
election methods. Both the Gaussian method and the Monte Carlo method set up
sensors on high degree nodes or even randomly choose nodes as sensors.
In the following, we rst choose four relatively small networks to compare the
performance of the proposed method to that of the three methods. Then, we introduce
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two well studied methods to select sensors for the three methods. Finally, we present
the detailed comparison results.
Four Relatively Small Networks
In order to compare with the three competeting methods, we choose four relatively
small networks:
 The Western U.S. Power Grid network [108],
 The Yeast protein protein interaction (PPI) network [39],
 Mention: the network of political communication between Twitter users [16].
 Retweet: the network of political communication between Twitter users [16].
The political communication dataset describes two networks of political communica-
tion between users of the Twitter social media platform (mention, and retweet) in
the six weeks prior to the 2010 U.S. Congressional midterm elections. We denote
the network of political retweets as Political Retweet, and the network of political
mentions as Political Mention. Statistics of these networks are given in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Statistics of Four Relative Small Networks in Experiments.
Dataset Mention Retweet Power grid Yeast
# nodes 7,175 18,470 4,941 2,361
# edges 28,473 121,043 13,188 13,554
Average degree 3.97 6.55 2.67 5.74
Maximum degree 425 1,017 19 64
# communities ( = 2) 636 1,462 37 2,271
# bridges ( = 2) 2,340 5,207 228 798
# communities ( = 0:10) 1,343 2,528 322 297
# bridges ( = 0:10) 2,245 4,966 689 513
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Figure 6.8: Degree distribution of the four networks. (A) Political Mention; (B) Political
Retweet; (C) Power Grid; (D) Yeast PPI network.
Sensor-selection Methods
Researchers in the work of [94] investigated various strategies to select sensors. They
conclude that high degree or high betweenness sensors are more ecient in identifying
rumor sources than other selected sensors. Therefore, we utilize these two strategies
to set up sensors for the three competeting methods.
 High-degree sensors [15]: we sort the nodes according their degree and choose
the high-degree nodes as sensors.
 High-betweenness sensors [68]: we sort the nodes according to their betweenness
centrality value, an choose the high-betweenness nodes as sensors.
Fig. 6.8 shows the degree distributions of the four networks. We can see that the
two political communication networks show power law degree distribution, and the
Power Grid and the Yeast PPI network tend to be exponential. The betweenness dis-
tributions of these networks are shown in Fig. 6.9. Correspondingly, the betweenness
distributions also show the scale-free or exponential phenomenon of these networks.
138
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
3
10
−4
10
−3
10
−2
10
−1
10
0
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
Betweenness
(A)
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
3
10
−5
10
−4
10
−3
10
−2
10
−1
10
0
Betweenness
(B)
10
0
10
2
10
4
10
−4
10
−3
10
−2
10
−1
10
0
Betweenness
(C)
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
3
10
−4
10
−3
10
−2
10
−1
10
0
Betweenness
(D)
Power Grid YeastPolitical Mention Political Retweet
Figure 6.9: Betweenness distribution of the four networks. (A) Political Mention; (B)
Political Retweet; (C) Power Grid; (D) Yeast PPI network.
We use the above high degree or betweenness strategies to set up sensors for the
existing methods. We let the number of sensors account for no more than 50% of
the total number of nodes in each network. For the proposed community structure
based method, in order to select fewer sensors, we typically set  = 0:10 for the Link
clustering method in detecting overlapping community structures, and set  = 2 for
the Infomap method in detecting separated community structures. The number of
communities and bridges of these four networks under dierent experiment settings
are shown in Table 6.3. We see that the number of communities is very small and the
number of sensors account for less than 30% of the number of nodes in each network.
Comparison Results
In the experiments, the diusion probability is chosen uniformly from (0,1), and the
diusion process propagates t time steps where t is uniformly chosen from [8,10].
We use detection rate to measure the accuracy of identifying diusion sources. The
detection rate is dened as the fraction of experiments that accurately identify the
real diusion sources. The higher detection rate, the better performance.
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Figure 6.10: Comparison of the proposed method with other methods in the accuracy of
identifying diusion sources when setting sensors at high-degree nodes in four moderate-
scale networks. (A) Political Mention; (B) Political Retweet; (C) Power Grid; (D) Yeast.
We rst compare the proposed method to the existing methods associated with
high degree sensors. More specically, we utilized the Infomap method [89] to detect
separated community structure of each network in this group of experiments. The
experiment results are shown in Fig. 6.10. We can see that the detection rate of the
proposed method is higher than that of the existing methods in each of the networks.
For the two political networks (see Fig. 6.10 (A) and (B)), 30% of experiment runs
can accurately identify the diusion sources. More than 90% of experiment runs can
identify a node within 2 hops away from the real source. Nearly 100% that the real
source is within 3 hops around the estimated source. Furthermore, the average error
distance from the real sources to the estimated sources is very small. However, for the
existing methods, only few experiment runs can accurately identify the real diusion
sources. Similar results can be found in the Yeast PPI network (see Fig. 6.10 (D)).
More than 90% of the experiment runs can accurately identify the real sources by
using the proposed method, while few experiment runs can accurately identify the
real sources by using the existing methods. The average error distance is much larger
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Figure 6.11: Comparison of the proposed method with other methods in the accuracy
of identifying diusion sources when setting sensors at high-betweenness nodes in four
moderate-scale networks. (A) Political Mention; (B) Political Retweet; (C) Power Grid;
(D) Yeast.
compared with that of the proposed method. The proposed method also outperforms
the existing methods in the Power Grid network (see Fig. 6.10 (C)).
We then compare the proposed method to the existing methods associated with
high-betweenness sensors. In this group of comparisons, we utilized the Link Cluster-
ing method [77] in detecting the overlapping community structure of each network.
The experiment results on the four networks are shown in Fig. 6.11. Similar to the
results in Fig. 6.10, the detection rate of the proposed method is higher than that
of the existing methods in each of the four networks. For the two political networks,
more than 50% of experiment runs accurately identied the real diusion sources in
the political Mention network, and more than 70% of experiment runs accurately
identied the real diusion sources in the political Retweet network. However, for
the existing methods, few of the experiment runs accurately identied the diusion
sources. Furthermore, the average error distance is larger compared with that of the
proposed method. Similar results can be found in the Power Grid network and the
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Figure 6.12: The relationship between degree and the average betweenness at each degree
of the four networks. (A) Political Mention; (B) Political Retweet; (C) Power Grid; (D)
Yeast PPI network.
Yeast PPI network. By using the proposed method, more than 45% of experiment
runs accurately identied the diusion sources in the Power Grid network, and more
than 60% for the Yeast PPI network. However, for the existing methods, few of the
experiment runs accurately identied the diusion sources. Furthermore, the average
error distance from the estimated sources and the real sources are larger compared
that of the proposed method.
From Figs. 6.10 and 6.11, we see that the existing methods show dierent per-
formances in the two dierent sensor selection methods. For example in Fig. 6.10
(D), the Monte Carlo method outperforms the Four-metric method with high degree
sensor selection method. However, in Fig. 6.11 (D), the Four-metric method outper-
forms the Monte Carlo method with the high betweenness sensor selection method,
and the Gaussian method shows similar performances. In order to see the impact
of using dierent sensor selection methods on the existing methods, we show in Fig.
6.12 the correlation between nodes' degree and their average betweenness of the four
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Figure 6.13: Linear correlation between relative infection time and average eective dis-
tance for the four relative small networks.
networks. As we can see, many nodes with the high degree tend to have high be-
tweenness. However, this is not always the case, as there are also some nodes with
low betweenness, especially for the political Retweet network and the Power Grid
network. This explains why the existing methods show dierent performances in
dierent sensor selection methods in Figs. 6.10 and 6.11.
Fig. 6.13 shows the linear relation between relative infection time of nodes and
their average eective distance from the diusion sources in the four relatively small
networks. We can see that relative infection time is linear with the average eective
distance in all these networks. Similar to the results in Figs. 6.6 (A) and 6.7 (A), the
scatter plot curves towards the end because almost all of the nodes have been infected
by then. The linear correlation in these networks again justies the eectiveness of
the proposed method.
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In summary, we see that the proposed community structure based method out-
performs the existing methods in identifying diusion sources based on sensor ob-
servations in various networks. The majority of the experiment runs can accurately
identify the real diusion source or a node that is close to the real source. However,
the existing methods show low performance, and the average error distance between
the estimated sources and the real diusion sources is very large.
6.5 Conclusion and Discussion
In this chapter, we proposed an ecient method to identify diusion sources based on
community structures in large-scale networks. To address the scalability issue in the
source identication problems, we rst detect community structure of the network
and nd bridges, which we assign as sensors. According to the infection time of the
sensors, we can easily determine from which community the diusion broke out. This
method dramatically narrows down the scale of the search for diusion sources and
therefore address the scalability issue in this area. Then we proposed a novel method
to locate the real diusion source from the rst infected community, and considered
the one with the highest correlation coecient as the real source. This method allows
us to consider only sources inside the suspicious communities, rather than the whole
network, which means the method can be applied just as eciently to large networks
as small ones. Experiments on large networks and comparison with many competitive
methods show signicant advantages of the proposed method.
From the present work, we see that a larger community size decreases the number
of sensors, resulting in a less cost for implementation and maintenance, but also
increases the number of nodes per community, and hence the number of suspects we
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nd, meaning results might not be accurate, and vice versa.
For future work, we may nd a better way of assigning sensors to balance cost
and accuracy through altering size or other aspects of communities. Furthermore,
most existing methods for detecting source only detect a single source, however it
may be the case that there are multiple sources in a single diusion event. Finding
multiple sources by adapting current methods is an interesting topic that can be
investigated further. In addition, real-world networks are often associated with time-
varying structure, such as collaboration networks. Future work could also take large
networks with time-varying structure into account.
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Algorithm 6: Community structure based approach
Assigning Sensors: Detect community structure of a given network, and then set the
community bridges as sensors.
Input: A set of infected sensors O = fo1; o2; :::; okg, and their infection times
T = ft1; t2; :::; tkg.
Initialization: The optimal diusion source s = ;, and the optimal correlation coecient
e =  1.
Step 1: Find the earliest infected sensor. Without loss of generality, we assume o1 is the
rst infected sensor. Choose o1 as the reference, and calculate the relative infection time of
all the infected sensors, denoted as
 = f0; t2   t1; t3   t1; :::; tk   t1g:
Find the communities that contain sensor o1, and combine the nodes in these communities,
denoted as
U = fu1; u2; :::; umg:
Step 2: Calculate the correlation coecient for each node in U and nd the one which has
the largest correlation coecient as follows.
for (each ui in U) do
Compute the eective distance between ui and any infected sensor oj , denoted as
 = [D(ui; o1); D(ui; o2); :::; D(ui; ok)]: (6.5.1)
Compute the correlation coecient between  and ,
e =
Pk
j=1(j   )(   )qPk
j=1(j   )2
qPk
j=1(   )
; (6.5.2)
where  is the mean of  , and  is the mean of .
if (e > e) then
Set e = e, and s = ui.
Output: The estimated optimal diusion source s.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Future Work
The research presented in this thesis consists of three main parts on the topic of
rumor source identication in complex networks : the rst part focuses on identifying
rumor source in time-varying networks; the second part focuses on identifying multiple
rumor sources; and the last part concentrates on eciently identifying rumor sources
in large-scale networks. The proposed methods aim to eectively detect rumor sources
and eventually quarantine the wide spread of rumors. This chapter summarizes the
research results and the main contributions of this thesis. Several open issues in
rumor source identication and future research directions have also been identied.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
Theoretical and experimental results have led to the conclusions and main contribu-
tions of this thesis. They are:
 We developed an eective method to identify rumor sources in time-varying
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networks. Traditional methods of rumor source identication assume rm con-
nections between individuals, which leads to the overtting problem of the un-
derlying network. In this thesis, we reduce the time-varying networks into a
series of static network windows. Based on the reduced network windows, we
proposed a reverse dissemination strategy to narrow down the suspicious rumor
sources. We also adopted the maximum likelihood estimation to pinpoint the
true rumor sources from the suspects with a high accuracy. Experiment result-
s justify the eectiveness of the proposed method in real-world time-varying
networks.
 We proposed a fast method to identify multiple rumor sources. Few of current
techniques can detect multiple rumor sources in complex networks and they all
suer from expensive computational complexity. In this thesis, we analyzed the
diusion patterns of multi-rumor spreading. Through combining K-means from
data mining and eective distance from epidemic propagation, we formulated an
optimization problem for multi-source identication and develop a fast method
to solve the optimization problem. Theoretical analysis proves the eciency of
the proposed method, and the experiment results demonstrate the eectiveness
of the proposed method in real-world networks.
 We addressed the scalability issue of identifying rumor sources in large-scale
networks. Traditional methods are too computationally expensive to be able to
quickly and accurately identify rumor sources in large-scale networks. In this
thesis, we explored the intrinsic phenomenon that rumor diusion is a network-
driven process. In particular, we focused on community structure of networks.
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Based on the community structure of networks, we successfully dramatically de-
creased the work of identifying rumor sources in the entire network to scanning
a small community of the network. Theoretical analysis proves the ecien-
cy of the proposed method, and the experiment results verify the signicant
advantages of the proposed method in large-scale networks.
7.2 Future Work
Although the proposed methods in this thesis have addressed three critical issues in
identifying rumor sources in complex networks, there are still problems that need to
be addressed. Some open issues are listed in this section as extensions of the presented
work in the thesis. All the proposed future work is in the domain of rumor source
identication in complex network. The following issues are ordered by the operational
diculties, from the easiest to the hardest.
7.2.1 Continuous Time-varying Networks
In Chapter 4, we developed a novel method to identify rumor sources in time-varying
networks by utilizing discrete time-integrating windows to express time-varying net-
works. The size of the time window could be minutes, hours, days or even months.
This may lead to new ideas of identifying rumor sources in continuous time windows.
In the real world, many complex networks   human contact network, online social
networks, transportation network, computer networks, to just name a few   present
continuous time-varying topologies. For example, in online social network websites,
users continuous publish posts and commenting on posts, which is an essential part of
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many social networking websites and forums. In many cases the data are recorded on
a continuous time scale. The approach proposed in this thesis analyses discrete time
windows, by dividing the entire time duration into several even intervals. This does
greatly simplify time-varying networks but also lose some latent features of continuous
time windows. The designing of detecting rumor sources in continuous time windows
is a new direction for future research.
7.2.2 Multiple Rumors on the Same Topic
In Chapter 5, we proposed an ecient method to identify multiple rumors in complex
networks. We considered multiple sources spreading the same rumor. In the real
world, however, there often exist several dierent rumors on the same event spreading
simultaneously in networks. These rumors may enhance the mass spreading of the
same event. Therefore, identifying multiple sources of multiple rumors is of great
signicance.
Current research on rumor source identication only considers one rumor diusion.
However, real-world events generally are more complicated. For example, some rumor
starting from March 2008 saying Obama was born in Kenya before bing own to
Hawaii were spread on social network websites. Some other rumor circulated on
social network websites about his religion. These would disqualify Obama from the
presidency. The rumors about the same event sometimes support each other, thus
enlarge and extract more and more attentions from the general public, and nally
mislead people. Therefore, how to identify sources of multiple rumors in complex
networks is a good topic for future research.
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7.2.3 Interconnected Networks
Current research on rumor source identication only considers rumor spreading in a
single network. However, real-world networks are often interconnected or even in-
terdependent. For example, in online social networks, a user could have a Facebook
account and also have a Twitter account. After the user received a rumor on Face-
book, he/she could also post the rumor on his/her Twitter account. Thus, the rumor
will successfully spread from Facebook to Twitter. However, detecting rumor sources
in interconnected networks is still an open issue. Therefore, identifying rumor sources
in interconnected networks is much more realistic than methods considered in a single
network.
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